弾道ミサイルを想定した住民避難訓練の実施

接続料の算定等に関する研究会（第89回）の開催について

電波法施行規則の一部を改正する省令案に係る意見募集

情報通信審議会 電気通信事業政策部会 通信政策特別委員会（第17回）開催案内

電波法施行規則等の一部を改正する省令案等に係る意見募集

デジタル空間における情報流通の諸課題への対処に関する検討会 デジタル広告ワーキンググループ（第1回）配付資料

デジタル空間における情報流通の諸課題への対処に関する検討会 デジタル広告ワーキンググループ（第2回）配付資料

EFF has joined with 23 other organizations including the ACLU, Restore the Fourth, the Brennan Center for Justice, Access Now, and the Freedom of the Press Foundation to demand that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) furnish the public with an estimate of exactly how many U.S. persons’ communications have been hoovered up, and are now sitting on a government server for law enforcement to unconstitutionally sift through at their leisure.

This letter was motivated by the fact that representatives of the National Security Agency (NSA) have promised in the past to provide the public with an estimate of how many U.S. persons—that is, people on U.S. soil—have had their communications “incidentally” collected through the surveillance authority Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. 

As the letter states, “ODNI and NSA cannot expect public trust to be unconditional. If ODNI and NSA continue to renege on pledges to members of Congress, and to withhold information that lawmakers, civil society, academia, and the press have persistently sought over the course of thirteen years, that public trust will be fatally undermined.”

Section 702 allows the government to conduct surveillance of foreigners abroad from inside the United States. It operates, in part, through the cooperation of large and small telecommunications service providers which hand over the digital data and communications they oversee. While Section 702 prohibits the NSA from intentionally targeting Americans with this mass surveillance, these agencies routinely acquire a huge amount of innocent Americans' communications “incidentally” because, as it turns out, people in the United States communicate with people overseas all the time. This means that the U.S. government ends up with a massive pool consisting of the U.S.-side of conversations as well as communications from all over the globe. Domestic law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), can then conduct backdoor warrantless searches of these “incidentally collected” communications. 

For over 10 years, EFF has fought hard every time Section 702 expires in the hope that we can get some much-needed reforms into any bills that seek to reauthorize the authority. Most recently, in spring 2024, Congress renewed Section 702 for another two years with none of the changes necessary to restore privacy rights. 

While we wait for the upcoming opportunity to fight Section 702, joining our allies to sign on to this letter in the fight for transparency will give us a better understanding of the scope of the problem.

You can read the whole letter here.

◆トーハン｢HONYAL｣サービスを開始　このほどトーハンは、小型書店の開業をサポートする少額取次サービス「HONYAL（ホンヤル）」を開始し受付を始めた。本の流通フローを簡略化し、少額の取引先とも持続的に取引が可能となる。書籍販売への新規参入を促進し、無書店自治体を失くす流れを作る。　取扱いは書籍の注文品のみ、返品は仕入額の15％まで、配送は週１回。想定月商は30万～100万円で、連帯保証人や信認金は原則不要。初期在庫費用も分割払いの相談を受ける。　トーハンの一般的な取引書..

When someone is placed on location monitoring for one purpose, it does not justify law enforcement’s access to that information for a completely different purpose without a proper warrant. 

EFF joined the Committee for Public Counsel Services, ACLU, ACLU of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in filing an amicus brief in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Govan, arguing just that. 

In this case, the defendant Anthony Govan was subjected to pretrial electronic monitoring as a condition of release prior to trial. In investigating a completely unrelated crime, the police asked the pretrial electronic monitoring division for the identity and location of “anyone” who was near the location of this latter incident. Mr. Govan’s data was part of the response, and that information was used against him in this unrelated case. 

Our joint amicus brief highlighted the coercive nature of electronic monitoring programs. When the alternative is being locked up, there is no meaningful consent to the collection of information under electronic monitoring. At the same time, as someone on pretrial release, Mr. Govan had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location information. As courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have recognized, location and movement information are incredibly sensitive and revealing. Just because someone is on electronic monitoring, it doesn’t mean they have no expectation of privacy, whether they are going to a political protest, a prayer group, an abortion clinic, a gun show, or their private home. Pretrial electronic monitoring collects this information around the clock—information that otherwise would not have been available to law enforcement through traditional tools.  

The violation of privacy is especially problematic in this case, because Mr. Govan had not been convicted and is still presumed to be innocent. According to current law, those on pretrial release are entitled to far stronger Fourth Amendment protections than those who are on monitored release after a conviction. As argued in the amicus brief, absent a proper warrant, the information gathered by the electronic monitoring program should only be used to make sure Mr. Govan was complying with his pretrial release conditions. 

Lastly, although this case is decided on the absence of a warrant or a warrant exception, we argued that the court should provide guidance for future warrants. The Fourth Amendment and its state corollaries prohibit “general warrants,” akin to a fishing expedition, and instead require warrants meet nexus and particularity requirements.  Bulk location data requests like the one in this case cannot meet that standard.  

While electronic monitoring is marketed as an alternative to detention, the evidence does not bear this out. Courts should not allow the government to use the information gathered from this expansion of state surveillance to be used beyond its purpose without a warrant.

On Global Encryption Day, we call on governments and the private sector to reject efforts to undermine encryption and instead pursue policies that enhance, strengthen and promote use of strong…

第7次エネルギー基本計画の特徴を一言でいえば、原子力産業の利活用拡大路線を具体化したものといえる。福島第一原発事故の教訓は忘れ去られている。経産省は原発依存を「可能な限り低減」させる具体的な計画を策定するべきなのにしなかった。

令和6年度「郵便局等の公的地域基盤連携推進事業」における　「共助型買物サービスと組み合わせた余積を活用した地産品の　当日配送サービスによる地域活性化」に関する実証事業の実施

デジタル時代における放送制度の在り方に関する検討会（第30回）配付資料

情報通信審議会　情報通信技術分科会　ITU部会 地上業務委員会（第86回）

情報通信行政・郵政行政審議会　電気通信事業部会（第148回）