Aggregator

EFF has joined with 23 other organizations including the ACLU, Restore the Fourth, the Brennan Center for Justice, Access Now, and the Freedom of the Press Foundation to demand that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) furnish the public with an estimate of exactly how many U.S. persons’ communications have been hoovered up, and are now sitting on a government server for law enforcement to unconstitutionally sift through at their leisure.

This letter was motivated by the fact that representatives of the National Security Agency (NSA) have promised in the past to provide the public with an estimate of how many U.S. persons—that is, people on U.S. soil—have had their communications “incidentally” collected through the surveillance authority Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. 

As the letter states, “ODNI and NSA cannot expect public trust to be unconditional. If ODNI and NSA continue to renege on pledges to members of Congress, and to withhold information that lawmakers, civil society, academia, and the press have persistently sought over the course of thirteen years, that public trust will be fatally undermined.”

Section 702 allows the government to conduct surveillance of foreigners abroad from inside the United States. It operates, in part, through the cooperation of large and small telecommunications service providers which hand over the digital data and communications they oversee. While Section 702 prohibits the NSA from intentionally targeting Americans with this mass surveillance, these agencies routinely acquire a huge amount of innocent Americans' communications “incidentally” because, as it turns out, people in the United States communicate with people overseas all the time. This means that the U.S. government ends up with a massive pool consisting of the U.S.-side of conversations as well as communications from all over the globe. Domestic law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), can then conduct backdoor warrantless searches of these “incidentally collected” communications. 

For over 10 years, EFF has fought hard every time Section 702 expires in the hope that we can get some much-needed reforms into any bills that seek to reauthorize the authority. Most recently, in spring 2024, Congress renewed Section 702 for another two years with none of the changes necessary to restore privacy rights. 

While we wait for the upcoming opportunity to fight Section 702, joining our allies to sign on to this letter in the fight for transparency will give us a better understanding of the scope of the problem.

You can read the whole letter here.

◆トーハン｢HONYAL｣サービスを開始　このほどトーハンは、小型書店の開業をサポートする少額取次サービス「HONYAL（ホンヤル）」を開始し受付を始めた。本の流通フローを簡略化し、少額の取引先とも持続的に取引が可能となる。書籍販売への新規参入を促進し、無書店自治体を失くす流れを作る。　取扱いは書籍の注文品のみ、返品は仕入額の15％まで、配送は週１回。想定月商は30万～100万円で、連帯保証人や信認金は原則不要。初期在庫費用も分割払いの相談を受ける。　トーハンの一般的な取引書..

When someone is placed on location monitoring for one purpose, it does not justify law enforcement’s access to that information for a completely different purpose without a proper warrant. 

EFF joined the Committee for Public Counsel Services, ACLU, ACLU of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in filing an amicus brief in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Govan, arguing just that. 

In this case, the defendant Anthony Govan was subjected to pretrial electronic monitoring as a condition of release prior to trial. In investigating a completely unrelated crime, the police asked the pretrial electronic monitoring division for the identity and location of “anyone” who was near the location of this latter incident. Mr. Govan’s data was part of the response, and that information was used against him in this unrelated case. 

Our joint amicus brief highlighted the coercive nature of electronic monitoring programs. When the alternative is being locked up, there is no meaningful consent to the collection of information under electronic monitoring. At the same time, as someone on pretrial release, Mr. Govan had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location information. As courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have recognized, location and movement information are incredibly sensitive and revealing. Just because someone is on electronic monitoring, it doesn’t mean they have no expectation of privacy, whether they are going to a political protest, a prayer group, an abortion clinic, a gun show, or their private home. Pretrial electronic monitoring collects this information around the clock—information that otherwise would not have been available to law enforcement through traditional tools.  

The violation of privacy is especially problematic in this case, because Mr. Govan had not been convicted and is still presumed to be innocent. According to current law, those on pretrial release are entitled to far stronger Fourth Amendment protections than those who are on monitored release after a conviction. As argued in the amicus brief, absent a proper warrant, the information gathered by the electronic monitoring program should only be used to make sure Mr. Govan was complying with his pretrial release conditions. 

Lastly, although this case is decided on the absence of a warrant or a warrant exception, we argued that the court should provide guidance for future warrants. The Fourth Amendment and its state corollaries prohibit “general warrants,” akin to a fishing expedition, and instead require warrants meet nexus and particularity requirements.  Bulk location data requests like the one in this case cannot meet that standard.  

While electronic monitoring is marketed as an alternative to detention, the evidence does not bear this out. Courts should not allow the government to use the information gathered from this expansion of state surveillance to be used beyond its purpose without a warrant.

On Global Encryption Day, we call on governments and the private sector to reject efforts to undermine encryption and instead pursue policies that enhance, strengthen and promote use of strong…

第7次エネルギー基本計画の特徴を一言でいえば、原子力産業の利活用拡大路線を具体化したものといえる。福島第一原発事故の教訓は忘れ去られている。経産省は原発依存を「可能な限り低減」させる具体的な計画を策定するべきなのにしなかった。

令和6年度「郵便局等の公的地域基盤連携推進事業」における　「共助型買物サービスと組み合わせた余積を活用した地産品の　当日配送サービスによる地域活性化」に関する実証事業の実施

デジタル時代における放送制度の在り方に関する検討会（第30回）配付資料

情報通信審議会　情報通信技術分科会　ITU部会 地上業務委員会（第86回）

情報通信行政・郵政行政審議会　電気通信事業部会（第148回）

「革新的情報通信技術（Beyond 5G（6G））基金事業」　令和6年度社会実装・海外展開指向型戦略的プログラム（共通基盤技術確立型）の公募結果

　９人の候補者が揃い、まさに「メディアジャック」状況で進められている自民党総裁選は、大宣伝の中で候補全員が「改憲・軍拡」を主張、選挙を前に、自民党キャンペーンを揃い踏みした。　もともと、総裁選は自民党内でトップをどうするか、の場。従って、政策論争はないのが当たり前で、議論をすればするほど、結果として、党全体の宣伝になる。　だが、メディアに露出して宣伝はしたいが、都合が悪い質問には答えるなと、｢国民不在｣の対応を指示していた。 自民党の総裁選選管は９月４日、所属議員に対し、｢..

A new bombshell scoop from NBC News revealed an internal U.S. Border Patrol memo claiming that 30 percent of camera towers that compose the agency's "Remote Video Surveillance System" (RVSS) program are broken. According to the report, the memo describes "several technical problems" affecting approximately 150 towers.

Except, this isn't a bombshell. What should actually be shocking is that Congressional leaders are acting shocked, like those who recently sent a letter about the towers to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas. These revelations simply reiterate what people who have been watching border technology have known for decades: Surveillance at the U.S.-Mexico border is a wasteful endeavor that is ill-equipped to respond to an ill-defined problem.

Yet, after years of bipartisan recognition that these programs were straight-up boondoggles, there seems to be a competition among political leaders to throw the most money at programs that continue to fail.

Official oversight reports about the failures, repeated breakages, and general ineffectiveness of these camera towers have been public since at least the mid-2000s. So why haven't border security agencies confronted the problem in the last 25 years? One reason is that these cameras are largely political theater; the technology dazzles publicly, then fizzles quietly. Meanwhile, communities that should be thriving at the border are treated like a laboratory for tech companies looking to cash in on often exaggerated—if not fabricated—homeland security threats.

The Acronym Game

EFF is mapping surveillance at the U.S.-Mexico border

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In fact, the history of camera towers at the border is an ugly cycle. First, Border Patrol introduces a surveillance program with a catchy name and big promises. Then a few years later, oversight bodies, including Congress, conclude it's an abject mess. But rather than abandon the program once and for all, border security officials come up with a new name, slap on a fresh coat of paint, and continue on. A few years later, history repeats.

In the early 2000s, there was the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS), with the installation of RVSS towers in places like Calexico, California and Nogales, Arizona, which was later became the America's Shield Initiative (ASI). After those failures, there was Project 28 (P-28), the first stage of the Secure Border Initiative (SBInet). When that program was canceled, there were various new programs like the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, which became the Southwest Border Technology Plan. Border Patrol introduced the Integrated Fixed Tower (IFT) program and the RVSS Update program, then the Automated Surveillance Tower (AST) program. And now we've got a whole slew of new acronyms, including the Integrated Surveillance Tower (IST) program and the Consolidated Towers and Surveillance Equipment (CTSE) program.

Feeling overwhelmed by acronyms? Welcome to the shell game of border surveillance. Here's what happens whenever oversight bodies take a closer look.

ISIS and ASI

An RVSS from the early 2000s in Calexico, California.

Let's start with the Integrated Surveillance Intelligence System (ISIS), a program comprised of towers, sensors and databases originally launched in 1997 by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A few years later, INS was reorganized into the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and ISIS became part of the newly formed Customs & Border Protection (CBP).

It was only a matter of years before the DHS Inspector General concluded that ISIS was a flop: "ISIS remote surveillance technology yielded few apprehensions as a percentage of detection, resulted in needless investigations of legitimate activity, and consumed valuable staff time to perform video analysis or investigate sensor alerts."

During Senate hearings, Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH), complained about a "total breakdown in the camera structures," and that the U.S. government "bought cameras that didn't work."

Around 2004, ISIS was folded into the new America's Shield Initiative (ASI), which officials claimed would fix those problems. CBP Commissioner Robert Bonner even promoted ASI as a "critical part of CBP’s strategy to build smarter borders." Yet, less than a year later, Bonner stepped down, and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found the ASI had numerous unresolved issues necessitating a total reevaluation. CBP disputed none of the findings and explained it was dismantling ASI in order to move onto something new that would solve everything: the Secure Border Initiative (SBI).

Reflecting on the ISIS/ASI programs in 2008, Rep. Mike Rogers (R-MI) said, "What we found was a camera and sensor system that was plagued by mismanagement, operational problems, and financial waste. At that time, we put the Department on notice that mistakes of the past should not be repeated in SBInet." 

You can guess what happened next. 

P-28 and SBInet

The subsequent iteration was called Project 28, which then evolved into the Secure Border Initiative's SBInet, starting in the Arizona desert. 

In 2010, the DHS Chief Information Officer summarized its comprehensive review: "'Project 28,' the initial prototype for the SBInet system, did not perform as planned. Project 28 was not scalable to meet the mission requirements for a national comment [sic] and control system, and experienced significant technical difficulties." 

A DHS graphic illustrating the SBInet concept

Meanwhile, bipartisan consensus had emerged about the failure of the program, due to the technical problems as well as contracting irregularities and cost overruns.

As Rep. Christopher Carney (D-PA) said in his prepared statement during Congressional hearings:

P–28 and the larger SBInet program are supposed to be a model of how the Federal Government is leveraging technology to secure our borders, but Project 28, in my mind, has achieved a dubious distinction as a trifecta of bad Government contracting: Poor contract management; poor contractor performance; and a poor final product.

Rep. Rogers' remarks were even more cutting: "You know the history of ISIS and what a disaster that was, and we had hoped to take the lessons from that and do better on this and, apparently, we haven’t done much better. "

Perhaps most damning of all was yet another GAO report that found, "SBInet defects have been found, with the number of new defects identified generally increasing faster than the number being fixed—a trend that is not indicative of a system that is maturing." 

In January 2011, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano canceled the $3-billion program.

IFTs, RVSSs, and ASTs

Following the termination of SBInet, the Christian Science Monitor ran the naive headline, "US cancels 'virtual fence' along Mexican border. What's Plan B?" Three years later, the newspaper answered its own question with another question, "'Virtual' border fence idea revived. Another 'billion dollar boondoggle'?"

Boeing was the main contractor blamed for SBINet's failure, but Border Patrol ultimately awarded one of the biggest new contracts to Elbit Systems, which had been one of Boeing's subcontractors on SBInet. Elbit began installing IFTs (again, that stands for "Integrated Fixed Towers") in many of the exact same places slated for SBInet. In some cases, the equipment was simply swapped on an existing SBInet tower.

Meanwhile, another contractor, General Dynamics Information Technology, began installing new RVSS towers and upgrading old ones as part of the RVSS-U program. Border Patrol also started installing hundreds of "Autonomous Surveillance Towers" (ASTs) by yet another vendor, Anduril Industries, embracing the new buzz of artificial intelligence.

An Autonomous Surveillance Tower and an RVSS tower along the Rio Grande.

In 2017, the GAO complained the Border Patrol's poor data quality made the agency "limited in its ability to determine the mission benefits of its surveillance technologies." In one case, Border Patrol stations in the Rio Grande Valley claimed IFTs assisted in 500 cases in just six months. The problem with that assertion was there are no IFTs in Texas or, in fact, anywhere outside Arizona.

A few years later, the DHS Inspector General issued yet another report indicating not much had improved:

CBP faced additional challenges that reduced the effectiveness of its existing technology. Border Patrol officials stated they had inadequate personnel to fully leverage surveillance technology or maintain current information technology systems and infrastructure on site. Further, we identified security vulnerabilities on some CBP servers and workstations not in compliance due to disagreement about the timeline for implementing DHS configuration management requirements.

CBP is not well-equipped to assess its technology effectiveness to respond to these deficiencies. CBP has been aware of this challenge since at least 2017 but lacks a standard process and accurate data to overcome it.

Overall, these deficiencies have limited CBP’s ability to detect and prevent the illegal entry of noncitizens who may pose threats to national security.

Around that same time, the RAND Corporation published a study funded by DHS that found "strong evidence" the IFT program was having no impact on apprehension levels at the border, and only "weak" and "inconclusive" evidence that the RVSS towers were having any effect on apprehensions.

And yet, border authorities and their supporters in Congress are continuing to promote unproven, AI-driven technologies as the latest remedy for years of failures, including the ones voiced in the memo obtained by NBC News. These systems involve cameras controlled by algorithms that automatically identify and track objects or people of interest. But in an age when algorithmic errors and bias are being identified nearly everyday in every sector including law enforcement, it is unclear how this technology has earned the trust of the government.

History Keeps Repeating

That brings us today, with reportedly 150 or more towers out of service. So why does Washington keep supporting surveillance at the border? Why are they proposing record-level funding for a system that seems irreparable? Why have they abandoned their duty to scrutinize federal programs?

Well, one reason may be that treating problems at the border as humanitarian crises or pursuing foreign policy or immigration reform measures isn't as politically useful as promoting a phantom "invasion" that requires a military-style response. Another reason may be that tech companies and defense contractors wield immense amounts of influence and stand to make millions, if not billions, profiting off border surveillance. The price is paid by taxpayers, but also in the civil liberties of border communities and the human rights of asylum seekers and migrants.

But perhaps the biggest reason this history keeps repeating itself is that no one is ever really held accountable for wasting potentially billions of dollars on high-tech snake oil.

漫画誌『モーニング』１０月３１日号に掲載された「辺野古行動に日当」の漫画に対し、モーニング編集部と当該の漫画「社外取締役　島耕作」作者・弘兼憲史氏が連名で、モーニングのホームページに２１日お詫びを掲載した。（大野和興）

三菱電機製数値制御装置(CNC)には、数値の入力に対する不適切な検証に起因する脆弱性が存在します。