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eシールに係る認定制度の関係規程策定のための有識者会議（第8回）

◆アマゾン日本売上高は約4.1兆　2024年アマゾン日本事業の売上高（ドルベース）は、274億100万ドル（約4.1兆円・前期比5.4%増）となった。2ケタ増収は2016年から2021年まで続いたが、直近3年は1ケタ増収にとどまっている。全売上高に占める日本の割合は4.3%、2023年比で0.2ポイント減った。世界各国の24年売上高は以下の通り。アメリカ → 4380億1500万ドル（前期比10.7%増）ドイツ → 408億5600万ドル（同8.7%増）イギリス → 378億..

Campaign Aims to Ensure that People Can Access Reproductive Rights Information Through Social Media

SAN FRANCISCO—The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and the Repro Uncensored coalition on Wednesday launched the #StopCensoringAbortion campaign to ensure that people who need reproductive health and abortion information can find and share it. 

Censorship of this information by social media companies appears to be increasing, so the campaign will collect information to track such incidents.  

“This censorship is alarming, and we’re seeing it take place across popular social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, where abortion-related content is often flagged or removed under vague ‘community guideline’ violations, despite the content being legal and factual,” said EFF Legislative Activist Rindala Alajaji. “This lack of transparency leaves organizations, influencers, and individuals in the dark, fueling a wider culture of online censorship that jeopardizes public access to vital healthcare information.” 

Initially, the campaign is collecting stories from people and organizations who have faced censorship on these platforms. This will help the public and the companies understand how often this is happening, who is affected, and with what consequences. EFF will use that information to demand that censorship stop and that the companies create greater transparency in their practices, which are often obscure and difficult to track. Tech companies must not silence critical conversations about reproductive rights.  

"We are not simply raising awareness—we are taking action to hold tech companies accountable for their role in censoring free speech around reproductive health. The stories we collect will be instrumental in presenting to the platforms the breadth of this problem, drawing a picture of its impact, and demanding more transparent policies,” Alajaji said. “If you or someone you know has had abortion-related content taken down or shadowbanned by a social media platform, your voice is crucial in this fight. By sharing your experience, you’ll be contributing to a larger movement to end censorship and demand that social media platforms stop restricting access to critical reproductive health information.” 

In addition to a portal for reporting incidents of online abortion censorship, the campaign’s landing page provides links to reporting and research on this censorship. Additionally, the page includes digital privacy and security guides for abortion activists, medical personnel, and patients. 

With reproductive rights under fire across the U.S. and around the world, access to accurate abortion information has never been more critical. Reproductive health and rights organizations have turned to online platforms to share essential, sometimes life-saving guidance and resources. Whether they provide the latest updates on abortion laws, where to find clinics, or education about abortion medication, online spaces have become a lifeline particularly for those in regions where reproductive freedoms are under siege.  

But a troubling trend is making it harder for people to access vital abortion information: Social media platforms are censoring or removing abortion-related content, often without a clear justification or policy basis. A recent example surfaced last month when Instagram posts by Aid Access, an online abortion services provider, were either blurred out or prevented from loading entirely. This sparked concerns in the press about how recent content moderation policy changes by Meta, the parent company of Instagram and Facebook, would affect availability of reproductive health information. 

For the campaign landing page: https://www.eff.org/pages/stop-censoring-abortion  

Contact:  RindalaAlajajiLegislative Activistrin@eff.org

With reproductive rights under fire across the U.S. and globally, access to accurate abortion information has never been more critical—especially online. 

That’s why reproductive health and rights organizations have turned to online platforms to share essential, sometimes life-saving, guidance and resources. Whether it's how to access information about abortion medication, where to find clinics, or the latest updates on abortion laws, these online spaces have become a lifeline, particularly for those in regions where reproductive freedoms are under siege. But there's a troubling trend making it harder for people to access vital abortion information: social media platforms are increasingly censoring or removing abortion-related content—often without clear justification or policy basis. 

A recent example surfaced last month when a number of Instagram posts by Aid Access, an online abortion services provider, were either blurred out or unable to load entirely. This sparked concerns in the press about how recent content moderation policy changes by Meta, the parent company of Instagram and Facebook, would affect the availability of reproductive health information. The result? Crucial healthcare information gets erased, free expression is stifled, and people are left in the dark about their rights and healthcare options.

This censorship is alarming, and we’re seeing it take place across popular social media platforms like Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok, where abortion-related content is often flagged or removed under vague "community guideline" violations, despite the content being perfectly legal and factual. This lack of transparency leaves organizations, influencers, and individuals in the dark, fueling a wider culture of online censorship that jeopardizes public access to vital healthcare information.

#StopCensoringAbortion: An EFF and Repro Uncensored Collaboration

In response to this growing issue, EFF has partnered with the Repro Uncensored coalition to call attention to instances of reproductive health and abortion content being removed or suppressed by social media platforms. 

We are collecting stories from individuals and organizations who have faced censorship on these platforms to expose the true scale of the issue. Our goal is to demand greater transparency in tech companies' moderation practices and ensure that their actions do not silence critical conversations about reproductive rights. 

We are not simply raising awareness—we are taking action to hold tech companies accountable for their role in censoring free speech around reproductive health. 

Share Your Story

If you or someone you know has had abortion-related content taken down or shadowbanned by a social media platform, your voice is crucial in this fight. By sharing your experience, you’ll be contributing to a larger movement to end censorship and demand that social media platforms stop restricting access to critical reproductive health information. These stories will be instrumental in presenting to the platforms the breadth of this problem, drawing a picture of its impact, and demanding more transparent policies.

If you’re able to spend five minutes reporting your experience, EFF and the rest of the Repro Uncensored coalition will do our best to help: https://www.reprouncensored.org/report-incident 

Even If You Haven’t Been Censored, You Can Still Help!

Not everyone has experienced censorship, but that doesn’t mean you can’t contribute to the cause. You can still help by spreading the word. 

Share the #StopCensoringAbortion campaign on your social media platforms and visit our landing page for more resources and actions. 

Follow Repro Uncensored and EFF on Instagram, and sign up for email updates about this campaign. The more people who are involved, the stronger our collective voice will be.

Together, we can amplify the message that information about reproductive health and rights should never be silenced—whether in the real world or online.

This is the third instalment in a four-part blog series documenting EFF's work in Europe. You can read additional posts here: 

• Saving the Internet in Europe: How EFF Works in Europe
• Saving the Internet in Europe: Defending Free Expression
• Saving the Internet in Europe: Fostering Choice, Competition and the Right to Innovate

EFF’s mission is to ensure that technology supports freedom, justice, and innovation for all people of the world. While our work has taken us to far corners of the globe, in recent years we have worked to expand our efforts in Europe, building up a policy team with key expertise in the region, and bringing our experience in advocacy and technology to the European fight for digital rights.  

In this blog post series, we will introduce you to the various players involved in that fight, share how we work in Europe, and discuss how what happens in Europe can affect digital rights across the globe. 

Implementing a Privacy First Approach to Fighting Online Harms

Infringements on privacy are commonplace across the world, and Europe is no exemption. Governments and regulators across the region are increasingly focused on a range of risks associated with the design and use of online platforms, such as addictive design, the effects of social media consumption on children’s and teenagers’ mental health, and dark patterns limiting consumer choices. Many of these issues share a common root: the excessive collection and processing of our most private and sensitive information by corporations for their own financial gain. 

One necessary approach to solving this pervasive problem is to reduce the amount of data that these entities can collect, analyze, and sell. The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is central to protecting users’ data protection rights in Europe, but the impact of the GDPR ultimately depends on how well it is enforced. Strengthening the enforcement of the GDPR in areas where data can be used to target, discriminate, and undermine fundamental rights is therefore a cornerstone in our work. 

Beyond the GDPR, we also bring our privacy first approach to fighting online harms to discussions on online safety and digital fairness. The Digital Services Act (DSA) makes some important steps to limit the use of some data categories to target users with ads, and bans targeteds ads for minors completely. This is the right approach, which we will build on as we contribute to the debate around the upcoming Digital Fairness Act. 

Age Verification Tools Are No Silver Bullet

As in many other jurisdictions around the world, age verification has become a hotly debated topic in the EU, with governments across Europe seeking to introduce them. In the United Kingdom, legislation like the Online Safety Act (OSA) was introduced to make the UK “the safest place” in the world to be online. The OSA requires platforms to prevent individuals from encountering certain illegal content, which will likely mandate the use of intrusive scanning systems. Even worse, it empowers the British government, in certain situations, to demand that online platforms use government-approved software to scan for illegal content. And they are not alone in seeking to do so. Last year, France banned social media access for children under 15 without parental consent, and Norway also pledged to follow a similar ban. 

Children’s safety is important, but there is little evidence that online age verification tools can help achieve this goal. EFF has long fought against mandatory age verification laws, from the U.S. to Australia, and we’ll continue to stand up against these types of laws in Europe. Not just for the sake of free expression, but to protect the free flow of information that is essential to a free society. 

Challenging Creeping Surveillance Powers

For years, we’ve observed a worrying tendency of technologies designed to protect people's privacy and data being re-framed as security concerns. And recent developments in Europe, like Germany’s rush to introduce biometric surveillance, signal a dangerous move towards expanding surveillance powers, justified by narratives framing complex digital policy issues as primarily security concerns. These approaches invite tradeoffs that risk undermining the privacy and free expression of individuals in the EU and beyond.

Even though their access to data has never been broader, law enforcement authorities across Europe continue to peddle the tale of the world “going dark.” With EDRi, we criticized the EU high level group “going dark” and sent a joint letter warning against granting law enforcement unfettered capacities that may lead to mass surveillance and violate fundamental rights. We have also been involved in Pegasus spyware investigations, with EFF’s Executive Director Cindy Cohn participating in an expert hearing on the matter. The issue of spyware is pervasive and intersects with many components of EU law, such as the anti-spyware provisions contained within the EU Media Freedom Act. Intrusive surveillance has a global dimension, and our work has combined advocacy at the UN with the EU, for example, by urging the EU Parliament to reject the UN Cybercrime Treaty.

Rather than increasing surveillance, countries across Europe must also make use of their prerogatives to ban biometric surveillance, ensuring that the use of this technology is not permitted in sensitive contexts such as Europe’s borders. Face recognition, for example, presents an inherent threat to individual privacy, free expression, information security, and social justice. In the UK, we’ve been working with national groups to ban government use of face recognition technology, which is currently administered by local police forces. Given the proliferation of state surveillance across Europe, government use of this technology must be banned.

Protecting the Right to Secure and Private Communications

EFF works closely on issues like encryption to defend the right to private communications in Europe. For years, EFF fought hard against an EU proposal that, if it became law, would have pressured online services to abandon end-to-end encryption. We joined together with EU allies and urged people to sign the “Don’t Scan Me” petition. We lobbied EU lawmakers and urged them to protect their constituents’ human right to have a private conversation—backed up by strong encryption. Our message broke through, and a key EU committee adopted a position that bars the mass scanning of messages and protects end-to-end encryption. It also bars mandatory age verification whereby users would have had to show ID to get online. As Member States are still debating their position on the proposal, this fight is not over yet. But we are encouraged by the recent European Court of Human Rights ruling which confirmed that undermining encryption violates fundamental rights to privacy. EFF will continue to advocate for this to governments, and the corporations providing our messaging services.

As we’ve said many times, both in Europe and the U.S., there is no middle ground to content scanning and no “safe backdoor” if the internet is to remain free and private. Either all content is scanned and all actors—including authoritarian governments and rogue criminals—have access, or no one does. EFF will continue to advocate for the right to a private conversation, and hold the EU accountable to the international and European human rights protections that they are signatories to. 

Looking Forward

EU legislation and international treaties should contain concrete human rights safeguards, robust data privacy standards, and sharp limits on intrusive surveillance powers, including in the context of global cooperation. 

Much work remains to be done. And we are ready for it. Late last year, we put forward comprehensive policy recommendations to European lawmakers and we will continue fighting for an internet where everyone can make their voice heard. In the next—and final—post in this series, you will learn more about how we work in Europe to ensure that digital markets are fair, offer users choice and respect fundamental rights.

ジェイズ・コミュニケーション株式会社が提供するRevoWorks SCVXおよびRevoWorks Browserには、ファイル検証不備の脆弱性が存在します。

シックス・アパート株式会社が提供するMovable Typeには、複数のクロスサイトスクリプティングの脆弱性が存在します。

Early in January 2025 it seemed like TikTok was on the verge of being banned by the U.S. government. In reaction to this imminent ban, several million people in the United States signed up for a different China-based social network known in the U.S. as RedNote, and in China as Xiaohongshu (小红书/ 小紅書; which translates to Little Red Book). 

RedNote is an application and social network created in 2013 that currently has over 300 million users. Feature-wise, it is most comparable to Instagram and is primarily used for sharing pictures, videos, and shopping. The vast majority of its users live in China, are born after 1990, and are women. Even before the influx of new users in January, RedNote has historically had many users outside of China, primarily people from the Chinese diaspora who have friends and relatives on the network. RedNote is largely funded by two major Chinese tech corporations: Tencent and Alibaba. 

When millions of U.S. based users started flocking to the application, the traditional rounds of pearl clutching and concern trolling began. Many people raised the alarm about U.S. users entrusting their data with a Chinese company, and it is implied, the Chinese Communist Party. The reaction from U.S. users was an understandable, if unfortunate, bit of privacy nihilism. People responded that they, “didn’t care if someone in China was getting their data since US companies such as Meta and Google had already stolen their data anyway.” “What is the difference,” people argued, “between Meta having my data and someone in China? How does this affect me in any way?”

Even if you don’t care about giving China your data, it is not safe to use any application that doesn’t use encryption by default. 

Last week, The Citizen Lab at The Munk School Of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, released a report authored by Mona Wang, Jeffrey Knockel, and Irene Poetranto which highlights three serious security issues in the RedNote app. The most concerning finding from Citizen Lab is a revelation that RedNote retrieves uploaded user content over plaintext http. This means that anyone else on your network, at your internet service provider, or organizations like the NSA, can see everything you look at and upload to RedNote. Moreover someone could intercept that request and replace it with their own media or even an exploit to install malware on your device. 

In light of this report the EFF Threat Lab decided to confirm the CItizen Lab findings and do some additional privacy investigation of RedNote. We used static analysis techniques for our investigation, including manual static analysis of decompiled source code, and automated scanners including MobSF and Exodus Privacy. We only analyzed Version 8.59.5 of RedNote for Android downloaded from the website APK Pure.

EFF has independently confirmed the finding that Red Note retrieves posted content over plaintext http. Due to this lack of even basic transport layer encryption we don’t think this application is safe for anyone to use. Even if you don’t care about giving China your data, it is not safe to use any application that doesn’t use encryption by default. 

Citizen Lab researchers also found that users’ file contents are readable by network attackers. We were able to confirm that RedNote encrypts several sensitive files with static keys which are present in the app and the same across all installations of the app, meaning anyone who was able to retrieve those keys from a decompiled version of the app could decrypt these sensitive files for any user of the application. The Citizen Lab report also found a vulnerability where an attacker could identify the contents of any file readable by the application. This was out of scope for us to test but we find no reason to doubt this claim. 

The third major finding by Citizen Lab was that RedNote transmits device metadata in a way that can be eavesdropped on by network attackers, sometimes without encryption at all, and sometimes in a way vulnerable to a machine-in-the middle attack. We can confirm that RedNote does not validate HTTPS certificates properly. Testing this vulnerability was out of scope for EFF, but we find no reason to doubt this claim. 

Permissions and Trackers

EFF performed further analysis of the permissions and trackers requested by RedNote. Our findings indicate two other potential privacy issues with the application. 

RedNote requests some very sensitive permissions, including location information, even when the app is not running in the foreground. This permission is not requested by other similar apps such as TikTok, Facebook, or Instagram. 

We also found, using an online scanner for tracking software called Exodus Privacy, that RedNote is not a platform which will protect its users from U.S.-based surveillance capitalism. In addition to sharing userdata with the Chinese companies Tencent and ByteDance, it also shares user data with Facebook and Google. 

Other Issues 

RedNote contains functionality to update its own code after it’s downloaded from the Google Play store using an open source library called APK Patch. This could be used to inject malicious code into the application after it has been downloaded without such code being revealed in automated scans meant to protect against malicious applications being uploaded to official stores, like Google Play. 

Recommendations

Due to the lack of encryption we do not consider it safe for anyone to run this app. If you are going to use RedNote, we recommend doing so with the absolute minimum set of permissions necessary for the app to function (see our guides for iPhone and Android.) At least a part of this blame falls on Google. Android needs to stop allowing apps to make unencrypted requests at all. 

Due to the lack of encryption we do not consider it safe for anyone to run this app.

RedNote should immediately take steps to encrypt all traffic from their application and remove the permission for background location information. 

Users should also keep in mind that RedNote is not a platform which values free speech. It’s a heavily censored application where topics such as political speech, drugs and addiction, and sexuality are more tightly controlled than similar social networks. 

Since it shares data with Facebook and Google ad networks, RedNote users should also keep in mind that it’s not a platform that protects you from U.S.-based surveillance capitalism.

The willingness of users to so quickly move to RedNote also highlights the fact that people are hungry for platforms that aren't controlled by the same few American tech oligarchs. People will happily jump to another platform even if it presents new, unknown risks; or is controlled by foreign tech oligarchs such as Tencent and Alibaba.

However, federal bans of such applications are not the correct answer. When bans are targeted at specific platforms such as TikTok, Deepseek, and RedNote rather than privacy-invasive practices such as sharing sensitive details with surveillance advertising platforms, users who cannot participate on the banned platform may still have their privacy violated when they flock to other platforms. The real solution to the potential privacy harms of apps like RedNote is to ensure (through technology, regulation, and law) that people’s sensitive information isn’t entered into the surveillance capitalist data stream in the first place.

We need a federal, comprehensive, consumer-focused privacy law. Our government is failing to address the fundamental harms of privacy-invading social media. Implementing xenophobic, free-speech infringing policy is having the unintended consequence of driving folks to platforms with even more aggressive censorship. This outcome was foreseeable. Rather than a knee-jerk reaction banning the latest perceived threat, these issues could have been avoided by addressing privacy harms at the source and enacting strong consumer-protection laws. 

Figure 1. Permissions requested by RedNote

Permission

Description

android.permission.ACCESS_BACKGROUND_LOCATION

This app can access location at any time, even while the app is not in use.

android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION

This app can get your approximate location from location services while the app is in use. Location services for your device must be turned on for the app to get location.

android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION

This app can get your precise location from location services while the app is in use. Location services for your device must be turned on for the app to get location. This may increase battery usage.

android.permission.ACCESS_MEDIA_LOCATION

Allows the app to read locations from your media collection.

android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE

Allows the app to view information about network connections such as which networks exist and are connected.

android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE

Allows the app to view information about Wi-Fi networking, such as whether Wi-Fi is enabled and name of connected Wi-Fi devices.

android.permission.AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS

Allows the app to use the account authenticator capabilities of the AccountManager, including creating accounts and getting and setting their passwords.

android.permission.BLUETOOTH

Allows the app to view the configuration of the Bluetooth on the phone, and to make and accept connections with paired devices.

android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN

Allows the app to configure the local Bluetooth phone, and to discover and pair with remote devices.

android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT

Allows the app to connect to paired Bluetooth devices

android.permission.CAMERA

This app can take pictures and record videos using the camera while the app is in use.

android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE

Allows the app to change the state of network connectivity.

android.permission.CHANGE_WIFI_STATE

Allows the app to connect to and disconnect from Wi-Fi access points and to make changes to device configuration for Wi-Fi networks.

android.permission.EXPAND_STATUS_BAR

Allows the app to expand or collapse the status bar.

android.permission.FLASHLIGHT

Allows the app to control the flashlight.

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE

Allows the app to make use of foreground services.

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_DATA_SYNC

Allows the app to make use of foreground services with the type dataSync

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_LOCATION

Allows the app to make use of foreground services with the type location

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PLAYBACK

Allows the app to make use of foreground services with the type mediaPlayback

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MEDIA_PROJECTION

Allows the app to make use of foreground services with the type mediaProjection

android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_MICROPHONE

Allows the app to make use of foreground services with the type microphone

android.permission.GET_ACCOUNTS

Allows the app to get the list of accounts known by the phone. This may include any accounts created by applications you have installed.

android.permission.INTERNET

Allows the app to create network sockets and use custom network protocols. The browser and other applications provide means to send data to the internet, so this permission is not required to send data to the internet.

android.permission.MANAGE_ACCOUNTS

Allows the app to perform operations like adding and removing accounts, and deleting their password.

android.permission.MANAGE_MEDIA_PROJECTION

Allows an application to manage media projection sessions. These sessions can provide applications the ability to capture display and audio contents. Should never be needed by normal apps.

android.permission.MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS

Allows the app to modify global audio settings such as volume and which speaker is used for output.

android.permission.POST_NOTIFICATIONS

Allows the app to show notifications

android.permission.READ_CALENDAR

This app can read all calendar events stored on your phone and share or save your calendar data.

android.permission.READ_CONTACTS

Allows the app to read data about your contacts stored on your phone. Apps will also have access to the accounts on your phone that have created contacts. This may include accounts created by apps you have installed. This permission allows apps to save your contact data, and malicious apps may share contact data without your knowledge.

android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

Allows the app to read the contents of your shared storage.

android.permission.READ_MEDIA_AUDIO

Allows the app to read audio files from your shared storage.

android.permission.READ_MEDIA_IMAGES

Allows the app to read image files from your shared storage.

android.permission.READ_MEDIA_VIDEO

Allows the app to read video files from your shared storage.

android.permission.READ_PHONE_STATE

Allows the app to access the phone features of the device. This permission allows the app to determine the phone number and device IDs, whether a call is active, and the remote number connected by a call.

android.permission.READ_SYNC_SETTINGS

Allows the app to read the sync settings for an account. For example, this can determine whether the People app is synced with an account.

android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED

Allows the app to have itself started as soon as the system has finished booting. This can make it take longer to start the phone and allow the app to slow down the overall phone by always running.

android.permission.RECEIVE_USER_PRESENT

Unknown permission from android reference

android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO

This app can record audio using the microphone while the app is in use.

android.permission.REQUEST_IGNORE_BATTERY_OPTIMIZATIONS

Allows an app to ask for permission to ignore battery optimizations for that app.

android.permission.REQUEST_INSTALL_PACKAGES

Allows an application to request installation of packages.

android.permission.SCHEDULE_EXACT_ALARM

This app can schedule work to happen at a desired time in the future. This also means that the app can run when youu2019re not actively using the device.

android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW

This app can appear on top of other apps or other parts of the screen. This may interfere with normal app usage and change the way that other apps appear.

android.permission.USE_CREDENTIALS

Allows the app to request authentication tokens.

android.permission.VIBRATE

Allows the app to control the vibrator.

android.permission.WAKE_LOCK

Allows the app to prevent the phone from going to sleep.

android.permission.WRITE_CALENDAR

This app can add, remove, or change calendar events on your phone. This app can send messages that may appear to come from calendar owners, or change events without notifying their owners.

android.permission.WRITE_CLIPBOARD_SERVICE

Unknown permission from android reference

android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE

Allows the app to write the contents of your shared storage.

android.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS

Allows the app to modify the system's settings data. Malicious apps may corrupt your system's configuration.

android.permission.WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS

Allows an app to modify the sync settings for an account. For example, this can be used to enable sync of the People app with an account.

cn.org.ifaa.permission.USE_IFAA_MANAGER

Unknown permission from android reference

com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL_SHORTCUT

Allows an application to add Homescreen shortcuts without user intervention.

com.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS

Unknown permission from android reference

com.asus.msa.SupplementaryDID.ACCESS

Unknown permission from android reference

com.coloros.mcs.permission.RECIEVE_MCS_MESSAGE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.google.android.gms.permission.AD_ID

Unknown permission from android reference

com.hihonor.push.permission.READ_PUSH_NOTIFICATION_INFO

Unknown permission from android reference

com.hihonor.security.permission.ACCESS_THREAT_DETECTION

Unknown permission from android reference

com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.CHANGE_BADGE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.READ_SETTINGS

Unknown permission from android reference

com.huawei.android.launcher.permission.WRITE_SETTINGS

Unknown permission from android reference

com.huawei.appmarket.service.commondata.permission.GET_COMMON_DATA

Unknown permission from android reference

com.huawei.meetime.CAAS_SHARE_SERVICE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.meizu.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.meizu.flyme.push.permission.RECEIVE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.miui.home.launcher.permission.INSTALL_WIDGET

Unknown permission from android reference

com.open.gallery.smart.Provider

Unknown permission from android reference

com.oplus.metis.factdata.permission.DATABASE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.oplus.permission.safe.AI_APP

Unknown permission from android reference

com.vivo.identifier.permission.OAID_STATE_DIALOG

Unknown permission from android reference

com.vivo.notification.permission.BADGE_ICON

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xiaomi.dist.permission.ACCESS_APP_HANDOFF

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xiaomi.dist.permission.ACCESS_APP_META

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xiaomi.security.permission.ACCESS_XSOF

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xingin.xhs.permission.C2D_MESSAGE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xingin.xhs.permission.JOPERATE_MESSAGE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xingin.xhs.permission.JPUSH_MESSAGE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xingin.xhs.permission.MIPUSH_RECEIVE

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xingin.xhs.permission.PROCESS_PUSH_MSG

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xingin.xhs.permission.PUSH_PROVIDER

Unknown permission from android reference

com.xingin.xhs.push.permission.MESSAGE

Unknown permission from android reference

freemme.permission.msa

Unknown permission from android reference

freemme.permission.msa.SECURITY_ACCESS

Unknown permission from android reference

getui.permission.GetuiService.com.xingin.xhs

Unknown permission from android reference

ohos.permission.ACCESS_SEARCH_SERVICE

Unknown permission from android reference

oplus.permission.settings.LAUNCH_FOR_EXPORT

Unknown permission from android reference

複数のマイクロソフト製品には、脆弱性があります。同社は、今回修正された一部の脆弱性を悪用する攻撃をすでに確認しているとのことです。この問題は、Microsoft Updateなどを用いて、更新プログラムを適用することで解決します。詳細は、開発者が提供する情報を参照してください。

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