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日本放送協会のインターネット活用業務の競争評価に関する準備会合(第7回)配付資料

令和6年度地方財政審議会（6月28日）議事要旨

労働力調査（基本集計）2024年（令和6年）6月分及び4〜6月期平均

情報通信審議会 電気通信事業政策部会 接続政策委員会（第72回）配布資料

令和6年7月25日からの大雨に関する被害状況等について（第15報）

The Kids Online Safety Act (KOSA) would censor the internet and would make government officials the arbiters of what young people can see online. It will likely lead to age verification, handing more power, and private data, to third-party identity verification companies like Clear or ID.me.

The government should not have the power to decide what topics are "safe" online for young people, and to force services to remove and block access to anything that might be considered unsafe for children. This isn’t safety—it’s censorship.

The proposed UN Cybercrime Convention is an extensive surveillance pact that imposes intrusive domestic surveillance measures and mandates states’ cooperation in surveillance and data sharing. It requires states to aid each other in cybercrime investigations and prosecutions, allowing the collection, preservation, and sharing of electronic evidence for any crime deemed serious by a country’s domestic law, with minimal human rights safeguards. This cooperation extends even to countries with poor human rights records.  Negotiations for this treaty began in 2022, initiated by a controversial proposal from the Russian Federation. If adopted, it will rewrite surveillance laws worldwide. Millions of people, including human rights defenders, journalists, security researchers, and those speaking truth to power, will be affected. Without clear, enforceable safeguards, the treaty risks becoming a tool for state abuse and transnational repression rather than protecting human rights. Below are our main concerns. For a comprehensive list, please refer to our redlines and appeal to EU Delegates. 

EFF’s Key Concerns  

The Title of the Draft Convention is Misleading and Problematic: Cybercrime is a real issue but equating it with any crime involving ICTs is conceptually and practically harmful. Recent efforts at the domestic level to broaden its definition have led to the criminalization of legitimate activities, such as online criticism, religious expression, or LGBTQ support. In the proposed treaty, it encourages expansive interpretations that could lead to human rights abuses and transnational repression. Recommendation: Restrict the definition to "core cybercrimes" like technical attacks on computers, devices, data, and communications systems. Exclude human rights-protected activities from the scope of the treaty to prevent misuse and ensure these rights are not unjustly targeted due to equating cybercrime with any crime using ICT. 
 
Expansive Scope and Over-Criminalization Risks: The draft Convention's criminalization chapter dangerously broadens its scope by including crimes like “grooming” and CSAM, not just cybercrimes. Its CSAM definition risks criminalizing consensual conduct between minors. Even worse, a proposed Protocol could add two more Ad Hoc sessions to discuss even more crimes, further expanding its broad scope. Recommendation: Criminalization must be limited to Articles 7 to 11. Narrow the scope of the CSAM article to target only intentional, malicious actions, exclude from criminalization consensual activity between minors, make exemptions for self-generated content by minors mandatory, ensure financing provisions target only those knowingly involved in illegal activities, and exclude the public interest use of such materials, such as evidence in crime investigations, and scientific or artistic materials.  

Overbroad Scope of Evidence Gathering Powers Will Enable Domestic and Cross-Border Spying on Acts of Expression: The open-ended scope of Chapters IV & V risks undermining law enforcement cooperation on actual cybercrime offenses by diluting resources. It lets governments spy on people to gather potential evidence for any crime if they’ve been committed using ICT. It also allows one state to help another in surveillance for any so-called serious crime. These expansions turn the treaty into an extensive surveillance pact. Article 23(2)(c) greenlights invasive measures for minor offenses and protected expressions abusively criminalized in some countries. Article 35(1)(c) means cooperation for serious crimes, defined as offenses punishable by four years or more, which can include acts of expression considered serious offenses in national law. This broad scope risks massive abuse of power. Recommendation: Limit Articles 23(2)(c) and 35(1)(c) to Articles 7 to 11 and delete Article 23(2)(b). Support OHCHR’s recommendation to revise the definition of serious crimes to mean only “those involving death, injury, or other grave harms,” as merely suggesting respect for human rights within such a broad scope is important but insufficient because it lacks enforceable protections against misuse and abuse. Ensure cooperation is limited to situations where there is a reasonable suspicion that legal assistance will produce evidence of a criminal offense.  

Insufficient Human Rights Safeguards: Article 24, which addresses conditions and safeguards and includes the principle of proportionality, fails to explicitly include other crucial principles such as legality, necessity, and non-discrimination. Effective human rights protections require judicial approval before conducting surveillance, transparency about actions taken, and notifying users when their data is accessed unless it jeopardizes the investigation. The new draft omits these safeguards, even worse it defers the few existing safeguards to national laws that can vary greatly and may not always provide the necessary protections. It also lacks safeguards for legally privileged information, fails to prevent compelled self-incrimination, and omits protections for criminal defense attorneys. These gaps raise concerns about the erosion of human rights: the treaty doesn’t raise the bar against invasive surveillance but rather confirms even the lowest protections, potentially undermining existing robust standards.  
 
Highly Intrusive Secret Spying Powers Without Robust Safeguards: The draft allows extensive secret surveillance with weak safeguards, posing significant risks both domestically and internationally. Domestically, it permits real-time interception of traffic data for any crime, while content interception is limited to serious crimes—offenses punishable by four years or more in domestic laws. Service providers are compelled to assist in these surveillance activities, often under perpetual gag orders, preventing notification even when investigations are no longer jeopardized. Internationally, the draft allows one state to assist another in carrying out such surveillance for serious crimes, forcing companies to comply with foreign surveillance requests, also in perpetual secrecy. This lack of transparency and accountability is a recipe for unchecked abuses of power and undermines trust in digital services. Recommendation: Delete Articles 29, 30, 45, 46. 

Compelled Technical Assistance: The draft requires countries to have laws enabling authorities to compel anyone with knowledge of a particular computer system to provide necessary information to facilitate access. This could involve asking a tech expert or engineer to help unlock a device or explain its security features, which may compromise security or reveal confidential information. (ie. an engineer might be arbitrarily required to disclose an unfixed security flaw or provide signed encryption keys that protect data). Recommendation: Delete Article 28(4).  

Lawless Law Enforcement Cooperation Risks Human Rights Erosion: The current wording of Article 47 risks supporting open-ended law enforcement cooperation without detailing the necessary limitations and safeguards required under international human rights law. States should not use this Convention to authorize or require personal data sharing beyond the scope of existing mutual legal assistance treaties, the safeguards established under the MLA, and the MLA vetting mechanism. Removing these safeguards without providing comparable protections and limitations invites misuse of the mutual legal assistance framework for abuse and/or repression. Recommendation: Limit Article 47(1) to Articles 7-11, delete Articles 47(1)(b), (c), and (f), and reference Articles 24 and 36 in Article 47(2). 

Insufficient Protection for Security Researchers and Other Public Interest Work: The draft Convention fails to exempt security research, journalism, and whistleblowing from criminalization, posing significant risks to cybersecurity and press freedom globally. This includes those involved in authorized testing or protection of ICT systems. However, the draft's provisions on illegal access, interception, and interference lack mandatory requirements for criminal intent and harm, threatening to penalize security research efforts. Full list of recommendations available here. 

Risks to LGBTQ and Gender Rights: The broad scope of the convention continues to pose significant risks to LGBTQ+ and gender rights. The domestic and international cooperation chapter could be exploited to target individuals based on their gender or sexual orientation, especially if domestic laws criminalize these expressions as serious crimes. This is particularly concerning given the history of cybercrime laws being misused to persecute marginalized groups. Recommendation: Restrict the scope of evidence gathering to core cybercrimes. Revise the definition of serious crime as per OHCHR’s recommendation. 
 
Want more information? Please contact EFF Policy Director for Global Privacy Katitza Rodriguez at katitza@eff.org. 
 
Download our PDF here.

 

International UN treaties aren’t usually on users’ radar. They are debated, often over the course of many years, by diplomats and government functionaries in Vienna or New York, and their significance is often overlooked or lost in the flood of information and news we process every day, even when they expand police powers and threaten the fundamental rights of people all over the world.

Such is the case with the proposed UN Cybercrime Treaty. For more than two years, EFF and its international civil society partners have been deeply involved in spreading the word about, and fighting to fix, seriously dangerous flaws in the draft convention. In the coming days we will publish a series of short posts that cut through the draft’s dense, highly technical text explaining the real-world effects of the convention.

The proposed treaty, pushed by Russia and shepherded by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, is a proposed agreement between nations purportedly aimed at strengthening cross border investigations and prosecutions of cybercriminals who spread malware, steal data for ransom, and cause data breaches, among other offenses.

The problem is, as currently written, the treaty gives governments massive surveillance and data collection powers to go after not just cybercrime, but any offense they define as a serious that involves the use of a computer or communications system. In some countries, that includes criticizing the government in a social media post, expressing support online for LGBTQ+ rights, or publishing news about protests or massacres.

Tech companies and their overseas staff, under certain treaty provisions, would be compelled to help governments in their pursuit of people’s data, locations, and communications, subject to domestic jurisdictions, many of which establish draconian fines.

We have called the draft convention a blank check for surveillance abuse that can be used as a tool for human rights violations and transnational repression. It’s an international treaty that everyone should know and care about because it threatens the rights and freedoms of people across the globe. Keep an eye out for our posts explaining how.

For our key concerns, read our three-pager:

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