三菱電機製GENESIS64およびMC Works64には、インストール時の不適切なファイルアクセス権設定の脆弱性が存在します。

2024年10月17日、JPCERT/CCは2024年7月から9月分の「JPCERT/CC 活動四半期レポート」「JPCERT/CC インシデント報告対応レポート」「ソフトウェア等の脆弱性関連情報に関する届出状況」を公開しました。本四半期中のJPCERT/CCの国内外の活動に加え、JPCERT/CCが報告を受け付けたインシデントの統計や事例などについてまとめています。参考資料としてご活用ください。

We at EFF have long recognized the threats posed by the unchecked technological prowess of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Since our founding in 1990, we have been in the forefront of efforts to impose meaningful legal controls and accountability on the secretive activities of those entities, including the National Security Agency (NSA). While the U.S. Senate’s Church Committee hearings and report in the mid-1970s documented the past abuses of government surveillance powers, it could not anticipate the dangers those interception and collection capabilities would bring to a networked environment. As Sen. Frank Church said in 1975 about an unchecked NSA, “No American would have any privacy left, such is the capability to monitor everything: telephone conversations, telegrams, it doesn't matter. There would be no place to hide.” The communications infrastructure was still in a mid-20th century analog mode.

burnham.jpg One of the first observers to recognize the impact of NSA’s capabilities in the emerging digital landscape was David Burnham, a pioneering investigative journalist and author who passed away earlier this month at 91 years of age. While the obituary that ran at his old home, The New York Times, rightly emphasized Burnham’s ground-breaking investigations of police corruption and the shoddy safety standards of the nuclear power industry (depicted, respectively, in the films “Serpico” and “Silkwood”), those in the digital rights world are especially appreciative of his prescience when it came to the issues we care about deeply.

In 1983, Burnham published “The Rise of the Computer State,” one of the earliest examinations of the emerging challenges of the digital age. As Walter Cronkite wrote in his foreword to the book, “The same computer that enables us to explore the outer reaches of space and the mysteries of the atom can also be turned into an instrument of tyranny. We must ensure that the rise of the computer state does not also mean the demise of our civil liberties.” Here is what Burnham wrote in a piece for The New York Times Magazine based on the reporting in his book:

With unknown billions of Federal dollars, the [NSA] purchases the most sophisticated communications and computer equipment in the world. But truly to comprehend the growing reach of this formidable organization, it is necessary to recall once again how the computers that power the NSA are also gradually changing lives of Americans - the way they bank, obtain benefits from the Government and communicate with family and friends. Every day, in almost every area of culture and commerce, systems and procedures are being adopted by private companies and organizations...that make it easier for the NSA to dominate American society...

Remember, that was written in 1983. Ten years before the launch of the Mosaic browser and three decades before mobile devices became ubiquitous. But Burnham understood the trajectory of the emerging technology, for both the government and its citizens.

Recognizing the dangers of unchecked surveillance powers, Burnham was a champion of oversight and transparency, and, consequently, he was a skilled and aggressive user of the Freedom of Information Act. In 1989, he partnered with Professor Susan Long to establish the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) at Syracuse University. TRAC combines sophisticated use of FOIA with data analytics techniques “to develop as comprehensive and detailed a picture as possible about what federal enforcement and regulatory agencies actually do . . . and to organize all of this information to make it readily accessible to the public.” From its FOIA requests, TRAC adds more than 3 billion new records to its database annually. Its work is widely acclaimed by the many academics, journalists and lawyers who make use of its extensive resources. It is a fitting legacy to Burnham’s unwavering belief in the power of information.

As EFF Executive Director Cindy Cohn has said when describing our work, we stand on the shoulders of giants. With his recognition of technology’s challenges to privacy, his insistence on transparency, and his joy in telling truth to power, David Burnham was one of them.

Full disclosure: David was a longtime colleague, client and friend.

情報通信審議会　情報通信技術分科会　陸上無線通信委員会（第88回）

弾道ミサイルを想定した住民避難訓練の実施

接続料の算定等に関する研究会（第89回）の開催について

電波法施行規則の一部を改正する省令案に係る意見募集

情報通信審議会 電気通信事業政策部会 通信政策特別委員会（第17回）開催案内

電波法施行規則等の一部を改正する省令案等に係る意見募集

デジタル空間における情報流通の諸課題への対処に関する検討会 デジタル広告ワーキンググループ（第1回）配付資料

デジタル空間における情報流通の諸課題への対処に関する検討会 デジタル広告ワーキンググループ（第2回）配付資料

EFF has joined with 23 other organizations including the ACLU, Restore the Fourth, the Brennan Center for Justice, Access Now, and the Freedom of the Press Foundation to demand that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) furnish the public with an estimate of exactly how many U.S. persons’ communications have been hoovered up, and are now sitting on a government server for law enforcement to unconstitutionally sift through at their leisure.

This letter was motivated by the fact that representatives of the National Security Agency (NSA) have promised in the past to provide the public with an estimate of how many U.S. persons—that is, people on U.S. soil—have had their communications “incidentally” collected through the surveillance authority Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. 

As the letter states, “ODNI and NSA cannot expect public trust to be unconditional. If ODNI and NSA continue to renege on pledges to members of Congress, and to withhold information that lawmakers, civil society, academia, and the press have persistently sought over the course of thirteen years, that public trust will be fatally undermined.”

Section 702 allows the government to conduct surveillance of foreigners abroad from inside the United States. It operates, in part, through the cooperation of large and small telecommunications service providers which hand over the digital data and communications they oversee. While Section 702 prohibits the NSA from intentionally targeting Americans with this mass surveillance, these agencies routinely acquire a huge amount of innocent Americans' communications “incidentally” because, as it turns out, people in the United States communicate with people overseas all the time. This means that the U.S. government ends up with a massive pool consisting of the U.S.-side of conversations as well as communications from all over the globe. Domestic law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), can then conduct backdoor warrantless searches of these “incidentally collected” communications. 

For over 10 years, EFF has fought hard every time Section 702 expires in the hope that we can get some much-needed reforms into any bills that seek to reauthorize the authority. Most recently, in spring 2024, Congress renewed Section 702 for another two years with none of the changes necessary to restore privacy rights. 

While we wait for the upcoming opportunity to fight Section 702, joining our allies to sign on to this letter in the fight for transparency will give us a better understanding of the scope of the problem.

You can read the whole letter here.

◆トーハン｢HONYAL｣サービスを開始　このほどトーハンは、小型書店の開業をサポートする少額取次サービス「HONYAL（ホンヤル）」を開始し受付を始めた。本の流通フローを簡略化し、少額の取引先とも持続的に取引が可能となる。書籍販売への新規参入を促進し、無書店自治体を失くす流れを作る。　取扱いは書籍の注文品のみ、返品は仕入額の15％まで、配送は週１回。想定月商は30万～100万円で、連帯保証人や信認金は原則不要。初期在庫費用も分割払いの相談を受ける。　トーハンの一般的な取引書..

When someone is placed on location monitoring for one purpose, it does not justify law enforcement’s access to that information for a completely different purpose without a proper warrant. 

EFF joined the Committee for Public Counsel Services, ACLU, ACLU of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in filing an amicus brief in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Govan, arguing just that. 

In this case, the defendant Anthony Govan was subjected to pretrial electronic monitoring as a condition of release prior to trial. In investigating a completely unrelated crime, the police asked the pretrial electronic monitoring division for the identity and location of “anyone” who was near the location of this latter incident. Mr. Govan’s data was part of the response, and that information was used against him in this unrelated case. 

Our joint amicus brief highlighted the coercive nature of electronic monitoring programs. When the alternative is being locked up, there is no meaningful consent to the collection of information under electronic monitoring. At the same time, as someone on pretrial release, Mr. Govan had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location information. As courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have recognized, location and movement information are incredibly sensitive and revealing. Just because someone is on electronic monitoring, it doesn’t mean they have no expectation of privacy, whether they are going to a political protest, a prayer group, an abortion clinic, a gun show, or their private home. Pretrial electronic monitoring collects this information around the clock—information that otherwise would not have been available to law enforcement through traditional tools.  

The violation of privacy is especially problematic in this case, because Mr. Govan had not been convicted and is still presumed to be innocent. According to current law, those on pretrial release are entitled to far stronger Fourth Amendment protections than those who are on monitored release after a conviction. As argued in the amicus brief, absent a proper warrant, the information gathered by the electronic monitoring program should only be used to make sure Mr. Govan was complying with his pretrial release conditions. 

Lastly, although this case is decided on the absence of a warrant or a warrant exception, we argued that the court should provide guidance for future warrants. The Fourth Amendment and its state corollaries prohibit “general warrants,” akin to a fishing expedition, and instead require warrants meet nexus and particularity requirements.  Bulk location data requests like the one in this case cannot meet that standard.  

While electronic monitoring is marketed as an alternative to detention, the evidence does not bear this out. Courts should not allow the government to use the information gathered from this expansion of state surveillance to be used beyond its purpose without a warrant.

On Global Encryption Day, we call on governments and the private sector to reject efforts to undermine encryption and instead pursue policies that enhance, strengthen and promote use of strong…

第7次エネルギー基本計画の特徴を一言でいえば、原子力産業の利活用拡大路線を具体化したものといえる。福島第一原発事故の教訓は忘れ去られている。経産省は原発依存を「可能な限り低減」させる具体的な計画を策定するべきなのにしなかった。