Contact /Last modified: May 5, 1997
1. Domestic Postwar Management
2. Postwar Management toward the Outside
3. Why Japan Has Neglected Postwar Compensation
Postwar management, which refers to various settlements after war, is categorized as either internal (domestic) or outward (international).
Internal management concerns ways of providing aid to domestic war victims. To deal with this, Japan passed 13 pieces of legislation, including the Veteran Pension Act; the Act for the Relief of the War Injured and Sick, and the Bereaved Families of War Dead; and the Repatriates Benefits Act. However, all Japanese postwar management legislation, except two atomic bomb-related pieces of legislation (the A-Bomb Victims Medical Care Act and the Special Allowance for A-Bomb Victims Act), excludes foreigners from beneficiaries through the nationality clause, and moreover, gives preferential treatment to former military members, providing no aid to civilian victims with few exceptions, such as repatriates from former Japanese territories. Through these 13 laws, about two trillion yen was allocated for aid in the national budget of FY1992.
The basic principle underlying Japan's aid administration is the "tolerance limit," which was mentioned in the previous chapter. The term, which is also often applied to pollution problems, means that a certain level of suffering should be tolerated. The argument goes like this: Atomic bombs were dropped and people died. That happened, however, in the midst of total warfare and should therefore be tolerated by war participants. Using this argument, Japan has never provided aid to ordinary civilian victims of, say, major aerial raids over Tokyo or Nagoya, or the disastrous ground battles in Okinawa. The only people receiving government aid are those with special relationships to the Imperial State, that is, state workers, military members and civilian employees of the military. The aid policy, therefore, obviously enforces inequality among war victims.
Opposite to this is the "principle of fair burden," the idea that the burden of war damages should be shared equally by everyone, and the majority of the world community is inclined to this idea. For instance, the German War Victims Aid Law carries through this spirit of distributing a fair share of the burden of war damages and sacrifice to every citizen. Thus, there is of course no distinction between military or civilian status, nor is there any nationality clause in the application of the law. In this vein, Germany enacted the Fair Burden Law to require owners of spared buildings to donate a certain percentage of the value of those buildings to fund reconstruction of buildings damaged by bombing. Here, relief measures for war victims are imbued by the spirit of democracy.
In Japan, movements calling for a "fair distribution of burden" (i.e., state compensation) for the relief of war victims have been carried on mainly by those concerned with A-bomb or aerial raid victims. Their idea finally won in court through an action concerning Korean A-bomb victims--the so-called Son Jin-Doo Case, ruled by the Supreme Court on March 30, 1978.
A Korean victim of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Son Jin-Doo, who had
been repatriated after the war, illegally reentered Japan to get medical
treatment for radiation-induced illness in Saga Prefecture in December
1970.
Jailed for a violation of the immigration control law, his illness quickly
worsened. Although he submitted in October 1971 an application for a health
passbook for A-bomb victims that is required to get proper treatment, it
was rejected. So, he filed suit calling for a reversal of the decision,
winning the first trial in Fukuoka District Court in March 1974 as well
as the second trial in Fukuoka High Court in July 1975, both of which were
successfully appealed by the government. His case finally went to the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court judgment read as follows:
"One aspect of the A-Bomb Victims Medical Care Law is to make the state, which executed the war, responsible for providing relief measures for such special war damages. In this sense, it cannot be denied that this system is in effect based on a consideration of state compensation."
This judgment suggested that relief measures for A-bomb victims should be managed with a spirit of state compensation. As a result, the court ordered the provision of relief to Son Jin-Doo, an illegal resident, reasoning,
"Considering the humane purpose of the law -- providing relief for A-bomb victims in light of their special health conditions -- and that the provision in Article 3-1 of the law anticipates victims who are not Japanese residents to be included as potential beneficiaries, providing relief to all A-bomb victims in Japan, whatever the reason for their stay, must be consistent with the idea of state compensation, which is the aim of the law."
Further significance of the ruling is found in the statement,
"(Providing relief to Son Jin-Doo is) acceptable to state ethics, considering the plaintiff was a Japanese national at the time of the bombing and later was denaturalized due to the effectuation of a postwar peace treaty that disregarded his will."
Namely, the ruling presented the view that denaturalization of individuals
from the former Japanese colony Taiwan and Korea, upon the effectuation
of the San Francisco Peace Treaty (1952), was a unilateral imposition of
disadvantage to them "regardless of their will," and that, considering
this, Taiwanese and Korean A-bomb victims should be equally aided on the
"moral grounds of the state."
Despite the Supreme Court's confirmation of the spirit of state compensation,
however, the Japanese government is still maintaining its discriminative
aid policy, continuing to exclude foreigners through the nationality clause.
This policy was reconfirmed and guided by an advisory panel chaired by
Kaji Seiji to the Health and Welfare Minister, in their report on December
11, 1980, concerning basic problems in relief measures for A-bomb victims.
The report reads:
In an emergency of war, where national survival is at stake, citizens may be forced to accept some sacrifice of life, injury or property during the war. This suffering should be tolerated equally by every citizen as a "general sacrifice" for the war effort. Thus, the war responsibility of the state could be discussed as political theory but, we believe, there is no way to make a claim for legally mandated relief on the grounds of the legal responsibility of the state for its initiation or termination of the war, which is one of its governing acts.
Using the expression, "equally tolerated by every citizen," the
report holds forth an idea that tries to put the burden of war sacrifice
on individuals as a civic duty. This report allowed thereafter the unfairness
of Japan's aid policy for war victims to continue.
Obviously, this is going against the international trend and is least likely
to be sustainable as is. In this regard, a very interesting decision was
made recently by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
The following provides background on the commission's view adopted on April
3, 1989.
French Army veterans from the former French colony Senegal acquired Senegalese
nationality upon its independence. As a result, their veteran pension payments
by the French government became smaller than those who remained French
nationals. Because of this, the Senegalese veterans of the French Army
appealed to the UN Commission on Human Rights, claiming that this treatment
is in violation of Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant B) (Japan ratified the covenant in 1979). Article
26, concerning the right to freedom, provides a principle of equality before
the law regardless of nationality:
...the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee equal and effective protection against discrimination on any grounds such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property ownership, birth, or any other status.
In reply to the appeal, the UN Commission on Human Rights judged that the treatment by the French government was discriminatory and in violation of Article 26. The reasoning made by the Commission follows:
In this case, there is exceptional treatment due to the acquisition of a new nationality as a result of the independence of a state. In the commission's view, nationality falls under the category of "other status" provided for in Article 26-2.
A change in nationality itself cannot be a reason for justifying exceptional treatment, in that payment of the pension is in return for one's provision of military service, for which there is no distinction between Senegalese and French citizens. Also, the differences between France and Senegal in their economic, financial and social conditions cannot be a legitimate reason. For if we compare both Senegalese and French veterans living in Senegal, they receive different benefits despite being in the same economic and social conditions. Finally, although the state concerned claims difficulties in satisfactorily confirming the identity and family background of candidates for pension in order to prevent fraud, the commission does not consider this a legitimate reason for differing pension rates, as administrative expediency and the possibility of unfair practices by recipients cannot justify unequal treatment. Therefore, the commission judged the exceptional treatment given to the informants was not based on rational and objective standards, but falls into the category of discrimination prohibited by the Covenant (for human rights). (retranslated from Japanese text)
So the commission expressed a simple, straightforward view that the current
difference in treatment, based on nationality is in violation of Article
26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, because
Senegalese and French veterans had provided the same military service.
Japan is a participant in the International Covenant of Human Rights, for
which the supreme authority for its interpretation lies with the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, rather than with the Supreme Court
of Japan, as it would be unacceptable if interpretation differed by country.
Therefore, Japan can no longer assert that "it depends on state decisions
when considering its policies," relying on the "tolerance limit
theory," as its Supreme Court has judged. It is now clear that there
should be no differences in the benefits of veterans' pensions because
of Korean or Taiwanese nationality. Also, inequality in the burden of war
sacrifice carried, depending the extent of one's involvement in the state
apparatus, is in violation of Article 26, and is even anachronistic in
the international community.
Another category of postwar management is international, represented by
interstate reparations settlements through peace and reparations treaties.
As explained in Chapter One, "Reparations" is a traditional concept
and means basically the booty surrendered by the loser to the victor. A
notable example is the astronomic amount of reparations imposed on Germany
after the First World War. It should be noted that the 132 billion marks
provided for by the Versailles Treaty included both reparations to states
and compensation to individuals. However, after the Second World War, given
the understanding that the excessive burden of reparations in Germany had
led to the rise of Nazism, the idea of reparations was largely dismissed
during postwar management. Partly because of the division of Germany after
the war, West Germany concentrated on individual compensation, leaving
reparations to the future after a hoped-for reunification occurred. After
the eventual reunification in 1990, however, a united Germany rejected
claims to reparations made by Britain and France, insisting that they had
already been resolved.
In Japan, the Allied Forces gave up their claim to reparations as victors
with the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in consideration of
the economic conditions of Japan at that time. Following this, China, Laos,
Cambodia, India, Malaysia, Singapore and the USSR renounced their claims
to reparations, releasing Japan from the burden of immense financial obligations.
However, reparations were made to some Asian countries through individual
postwar treaties: $550 million in installments over 20 years to the Philippines
(concluded in 1956); $39 million over five years to Vietnam (1959); $223
million over 12 years to Indonesia (1958); and $200 million over ten years
to Burma (1954).
Besides such "reparations," another type of international war
management is the "management of claims." As described in the
Chapter One, this is a kind of liquidation of property claims between a
suzerain state and its former colony at the time of independence. For this
purpose, Japan made an agreement concerning claims and economic cooperation
with South Korea, providing $300 million, not to be repaid, and a $200
million contribution repayable over 10 years.
This is all that Japan paid toward reparations and agreements on claims
and economic cooperation. In total, it was only about $1.5 billion to five
countries, the result of a successful "bargaining down of Japan's
burden" (as remarked on by former Vice Foreign Minister Ryozo Sunobe)
by the Japanese government. This becomes even clearer when comparisons
with Germany are made.
As explained in Chapter One, besides interstate "reparations"
and "claims," there is the concept of "compensation"
which was established after the Second World War. The latter involves rather
a moral obligation containing a sense of redress for unlawful damages in
a war of aggression.
In Germany, post-Second World War management concentrated on "compensation."
Germany has paid out about $60 billion in compensation (see Chapter Four-1),
while Japan has paid no compensation. Moreover, what Japan paid for "reparations"
is only $1.5 billion to five countries. The difference is the debt to Asian
countries Japan owes as a result of having bilked them. In other words,
this fact forms the social backdrop for a surge of outcries for postwar
compensation from the Asian and Pacific regions after more than 45 years
since the end of the war.
But why was there no postwar compensation paid by Japan for more than 45
years after the war? Compared with Germany, there seem to be three major
reasons.
First, the US showed a different response to the issue. The US preferred
to use Japan as a pawn against the USSR rather than focusing Japan to establish
its morality, given the difference in the timing of surrender and the absence
of Jewish victims, as well as the difference in the nature of the occupying
forces and certain vulnerability of the US that derived from its morally
questionable use of atomic bombs. Incorporating Japan into the Cold War
was given priority over bringing Japan to justice for its past wrongs.
As a result, the International War Crimes Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo
Trial) only tried some of the leaders of the war as well as the rank and
file of the Imperial Military on the basis of "crimes against the
peace" and "war crimes," without directly applying "crimes
against humanity." Also, the tribunal did not prosecute the Emperor,
and left most of the leadership and bureaucrats that supported Japanese
militarism intact, exempting them from their war responsibility. This must
surely be closely related to the long neglect of postwar compensation.
Then, there were differences in neighboring states. Unlike the adamant
neighbors which surrounded Germany, China and other neighboring states
took a principally generous stance toward Japan. Few countries have directly
demanded compensation on behalf of their citizens victimized during the
war atrocities committed by Japan.
The Allied Forces renounced most of their reparations claims in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty in consideration to Japan's viability. China, Taiwan,
India and the USSR followed suit. For South Korea, the Philippines, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Singapore and others, Japan concluded its postwar management treaties
and paid only about $1.5 billion in total in reparations and claims settlements.
Yet even this sum of money, in some respects, was utilized as a tool for
Japanese economic penetration into these regions. The background of this
was that, most importantly, these Asian nations were trapped by socio-economical
instabilities for long after the end of the war, which slowed the pace
of domestic democratization and helped to suppress the voices of these
war victims on the bottom rungs of society. Many of these states preferred
to make compromises with Japan, rather than listen to the voices of victims
of Japanese aggression, in order to rebuild their country.
For instance, South Korea, suppressing a considerable domestic opposition
movement, managed to conclude the Japan-ROK Basic Treaty in 1965. In the
treaty, the voices of Korean war victims were quite insufficiently represented.
Korean Chief Presidential Assistant at the time of the conclusion, Min
Chug-shik, at the International Forum on War Reparations for the Asia-Pacific
Region in August 1991, testified that the conclusion of the Japan-ROK Basic
Treaty was totally dominated by Japan, in particular, the agreement on
claims and economic cooperation, for which Japan had drawn up the draft,
and that then-President Pak Chong-hui had no choice but accept the terms
due to a domestic political crisis then threatening the existence of his
government.
Moreover, China, which suffered most from Japanese Imperialism, did not
accuse the Japanese of aggression, using the reasoning that people in Japan
are as well the victims of Japanese imperialism as people in China. This
eventually resulted in the loss of an ideal opportunity for Japan to undertake
relief measures for allegedly over ten million victims in China, and to
rectify past injustices, thus bringing about a change in society and establishing
a national sense of morality.
Finally, there are differences in the nature of consciousness and the various
movements within the country. Japanese opinion makers, including intellectuals
and politicians, were much too involved in the Cold War hostilities, concentrating
on ideological discussions, with little attention paid to Japan's past
injustices to Asian and Pacific regions. Also there are few groups that
have taken up the process of self-reflection for Japanese society. This
provides a sharp contrast to Germany, where academic groups and student
movements, helped by politicians, have seriously taken up the fight to
"overcome the past"(see Chapter Four). Then, we see a contrasting
picture of the two countries: in Germany, people have tried to establish
their own moral framework by questioning on the injustices committed by
their parents" generation; in Japan, people have poured all their
energy into rebuilding the economy, under the strong influence of still-powerful
parents who possess authority.
| Presented by RUR-55, Link free Contact /Last modified: May 5, 1997 |
|