By JCA-NET Bord of Directors
Feb 19, 2026
(Summary)
The House of Representatives election held on February 8, 2026, became the first election in Japan to reveal a new trend of unfair public opinion manipulation through election interference using social media. The number of social media users in Japan is extremely high, making its influence on elections impossible to ignore. Particularly noteworthy is the phenomenon where a YouTube video by the LDP’s Takaichi administration achieved well over 100 million views in a short period.
While elections using the internet appear to enable campaigns based on individuals’ free dissemination of information online, the greatest influence came from the existence of profit-driven platforms—those monetizing through algorithms (mechanical procedures) that control post visibility and sharing, and through ad displays. Without these platforms, the LDP likely could not have garnered over 100 million views and translated that into voting behavior. Platformers are not neutral entities; they profit by fueling discrimination and xenophobia. Their executives support the Trump administration in the US, and their ties to Japanese government are close.
Given this context, while we cannot assess that the Takaichi administration’s policies themselves received substantive electoral endorsement, securing an overwhelming majority of seats will likely accelerate the push toward constitutional amendments, militarization, and a surveillance society. In response, we must urgently shift away from information dissemination reliant on platform operators. We must prioritize the right to communication and human rights by adopting free software/open source and federated SNS platforms that resist government surveillance societies.
1. Unfair Public Opinion Manipulation Through Election Interference Using SNS
The House of Representatives election held on February 8, 2026, resulted in a historic landslide victory for the LDP Takai administration. From our perspective as advocates for communication rights, we wish to express our concerns regarding several problematic aspects of this election.
Notably, this election clearly established a structure where SNS1 served as the primary battleground, mobilizing voters from street rallies to polling stations in the physical world. Simultaneously, messages inherently prone to discrimination and prejudice on SNS spread unnaturally widely. This likely shifted the election’s focus toward arguments justifying the exclusion of foreigners. This election can be seen as the first in Japan to reveal a new trend: unfair public opinion manipulation through election interference leveraging SNS, a pattern previously observed in countries like the United States.
The number of SNS users in Japan is extremely high, making their influence on elections undeniable. For example, LINE has the largest number of monthly active users in Japan at 100 million, followed by YouTube with 73 million and X with 68 million.2 On the other hand, surveys (regarding the 2024 House of Representatives election) indicate that reliable sources influencing the credibility of election information and voting decisions still rank traditional television, newspapers, and election publicity materials highly, while social media is perceived as lacking credibility.3 Therefore, social media should not be overestimated. Nevertheless, monitoring these trends remains essential for communication rights advocacy.
Particularly noteworthy is the phenomenon where a YouTube video by the LDP’s Takaichi administration achieved well over 100 million views in a short period. 4 As many media outlets have questioned, surpassing 100 million views in such a short time is highly unusual. It appears the strategy succeeded in steering voting behavior toward the LDP. This involved utilizing various SNS platforms and, notably, employing tactics like targeted advertising specifically aimed at non-partisans and swing voters.
2. Why were over 100 million views achieved?
At first glance, internet-driven elections might seem to enable campaigns based on individuals freely disseminating information online. However, the most significant influence came from algorithms (mechanical procedures) that control post visibility and sharing, and from profit-driven platform operators5 that generate revenue through ad displays. Various issues regarding this aspect have already been pointed out.6
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) can be seen as having effectively utilized commercial advertising techniques in its election campaign, securing an overwhelmingly large number of views in a short period. While the Public Offices Election Act imposes certain restrictions on using internet advertising, 7 political activities by parties are permitted. Thus, it can be interpreted that the LDP skillfully leveraged this allowance to conduct its election campaign. The transfer of commercial advertising techniques into the political sphere raises the following issues:
- Massive advertising expenditure8 exerted a dominant influence over the media environment encountered by voters.
- Commercial advertising techniques control people’s behavior by leveraging the psychological impact of imagery. These techniques were used as a means to deliberately divert attention away from deeper discussions and understanding of policies.
- Political parties like the LDP, which acquire official SNS accounts and disseminate information through paid services, occupy a different position than the many users relying on free services. Official SNS accounts can access and analyze various user trends collected by platform operators, such as residence, gender, age, and preferences.
- As a result, voters are no longer guaranteed true “anonymity.”
3. Plattformers Are Not Neutral
Current law imposes no legal requirement for mass media to remain neutral during elections; rather, it guarantees their freedom to support or criticize specific parties or candidates. 9 Similarly, platformers are not legally obligated to maintain political neutrality or fairness. While it is unclear what political stance platformers took in this election, unlike mass media, the psychological influence platformers exert on voters’ voting behavior is more direct. It is known that they can manipulate how ads and posts are displayed using algorithms. It is technically not impossible for platformers to secretly support the government, utilizing their algorithms to favor the government while keeping this hidden from users, or to manipulate algorithms to covertly restrict opposition parties’ communications. (Notable international examples include the cases of Cambridge Analytica in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the UK’s EU withdrawal referendum10)
It is important to bear in mind that major US tech giants like YouTube, X, Facebook, Microsoft, and Apple are all companies that supported the Trump administration, and that the Trump administration and the Takaichi administration have an extremely close relationship. On the other hand, companies like LINE are involved in collaborative projects with governments and local authorities, and their revenue is also heavily tied to central and local governments. 11 These platform operators also utilize detailed data, which allows them to understand user behavior, for their own business purposes. Given this reality, it cannot be denied that algorithms influencing social media users’ posts and their dissemination could be repurposed for election campaigns, potentially impacting voting behavior. We cannot help but be deeply concerned about this.
Historically, the LDP, as a party supported by Japan’s business community, has clung to corporate donations. For many years after the War II, the LDP was backed by so-called “heavy and large-scale” industries, centered on manufacturing. However, the backbone of today’s major corporations lies in industries like information and communications technology (ICT), which provide services inseparable from our right to communicate.12 As mentioned earlier, when ICT companies engage in politics and elections, acting in ways favorable to the ruling party, it carries profound implications entirely distinct from traditional vote-gathering tactics like cooperating in elections in exchange for infrastructure projects like bridges and roads.
Platformers possess the power to influence voters’ emotions and psychology using their vast holdings of big data, potentially directly controlling voting behavior. Moreover, the deeper platformers become involved in elections, the more big data on voter behavior accumulates, creating a synergistic effect where the likelihood of the ruling party exploiting this data also increases.
On the other hand, platformers have repeatedly been criticized for operating within a structure that generates profits by fueling tendencies that underpin hate speech, discrimination, and xenophobia.13 In this election too, it cannot be denied that such tendencies among platformers may have disproportionately amplified discrimination and xenophobia as election issues.
Given the platformers’ power to control information dissemination, the ruling party’s massive advertising expenditure, the political stances of platform executives, and their collaborative relationships with the government, this election likely unfolded within an unfair media environment unlike any seen before. Going forward, there is a risk that a public opinion structure could be artificially constructed where parties with strong financial backing and ideological affinity with platform executives gain increasing electoral advantage.
Given this media environment, it is difficult to assess that the policies of the Takaichi administration were genuinely endorsed by the election. Nevertheless, securing an overwhelming majority of seats makes it possible to force through major changes to the framework of governance—such as constitutional revision, militarization, and surveillance society expansion—leading to a more authoritarian power structure.
4. Issues Raised from the Perspective of the Right to Communication Movement
Correcting the structural distortions created by platformers is no easy task. However, there remains much each of us can do to defend our right to communication and secure an even broader sphere of rights.
Above all, we must recognize that massive platformers are neither allies of our right to communication nor our human rights. Rather, the free and convenient platformer services many of us depend on can become “traps” designed to surveillance and control us. That is,
- Recognize that commercial SNS platforms are not fair and neutral environments for information dissemination. They are domains governed by algorithms unilaterally determined by platform operators.
- Recognize that using platform operators simultaneously risks the theft of users’ various personal data. This extends not only to the users themselves but also to others who follow or access their posts.
- Such personal data could potentially be exploited by governments or other powerful entities in the future. Even if current laws impose restrictions, these can easily be weakened or repealed.
- The algorithms of for-profit platformers contain mechanisms that incite discrimination, bias, and exclusion. Furthermore, major platformers are complicit in war crimes like the genocide in Gaza, operating within a structure that profits from hatred and war.
In response, activist groups—including civic, labor, and social movements—must not rely solely on information dissemination through traditional for-profit platforms. Where possible, we must explore combining open-source/free software with federated services that are not centralized commercial offerings. We must pursue a transition, wherever possible, to communication services that prioritize human rights and peace, without contributing to discrimination, xenophobia, or war. Without such efforts, escaping the unjust online communication environment is impossible. As an organization that pioneered the right to communication movement in Japan, JCA-NET particularly opposes the strengthening of internet surveillance and enforcement, such as the creation of spy agencies.
Furthermore, we oppose the institutionalization of discrimination and exclusion against foreign nationals living in Japan, and the strengthening of foundations that allow heightened xenophobia and nationalist emotional agitation to dominate online public opinion. We are determined to redouble our efforts to shift from information dissemination platforms prioritizing national interests and capital gains to platforms that place people’s right to survival and human rights above all else.
Footnotes:
The titles of the referenced literature have been translated into English, but the original text is entirely in Japanese.
1
The term “SNS” used here collectively refers to interactive social media platforms such as X, Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and Line. However, YouTube is also specifically included in this context.
2
“February 2026 Edition] Popular SNS User Rankings in Japan and Abroad | X (Twitter), Instagram, TikTok, and 15 Other Platforms” https://www.comnico.jp/we-love-social/sns-users
3
Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, Newspaper Science Research Institute “How to Decide Who to Vote for in the House of Representatives Election? 3 Steps to Gather Election Information and Useful Information Sources” https://np-labo.com/archives/episode/202506kiji-02
4
(FLASH) Influencers Raise Questions About “Abnormally High” YouTube Views for Takaichi Video… Approx. 90 Million Views, “Hikakin-Level” Mega Hit (Somehow in Entertainment Section) https://smart-flash.jp/entertainment/entertainment-news/390495/
(Pinsuba) Takaichi’s PR Video Breaks Japan’s Record for Fastest “100 Million Views,” Easily Surpassing YOASOBI’s “Legendary Record” and Causing an Uproar Online https://pinzuba.news/articles/-/14187
Jiji Press: Takaichi’s Video Unusually Hits 100 Million Views; SNS Questions “Advertising” [2026 House Election] https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2026020400969&g=pol
Tokyo Shimbun: “The Mystery of the ‘Takaichi Video’ Exceeding 130 Million Views” – Part of the February 7 Special Report https://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/article/467084
5
A platform operator is “a general term for businesses that utilize information and communication technology (ICT) and data to provide users with a ‘platform’ for diverse services.” https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E3%83%87%E3%82%B8%E3%82%BF%E3%83%AB%E3%83%BB%E3%83%97%E3%83%A9%E3%83%83%E3%83%88% E3%83%95%E3%82%A9%E3%83%BC%E3%83%9E%E3%83%BC Here, we primarily have in mind companies providing so-called major SNS services.
6
“Regulation Debate on ‘Video View Count Boosting’ in SNS Elections: LDP Outlines Key Points” Nikkei https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA051GZ0V00C25A2000000/ “Takaichi’s Video Reaches 130 Million Views; All Parties Focus on Advertising; Challenges Under Public Offices Election Law” Asahi Shimbun https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASV2623XSV26UTFK002M.html
7
The Public Offices Election Act establishes certain prohibitions regarding advertising functions on the internet, such as websites. (Article 142-6 of the Public Offices Election Act) However, exceptions exist. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has interpreted that “during the election campaign period, paid internet advertisements directly linking to the election campaign websites of the relevant political parties, etc., are permitted (Article 142-6, Paragraph 4 of the Revised Public Offices Election Act).”
8
We do not have data on the advertising costs the Liberal Democratic Party spent on SNS. However, for example, assuming that to achieve 100 million views on YouTube over a period of about two weeks, all display advertising functions were utilized, along with profiling features like targeted advertising and integration with SNS, the cost could potentially reach hundreds of millions of yen.
9
Public Offices Election Act Article 148 “Article 148. The provisions of this Act concerning restrictions on election campaigning (excluding the provisions of Article 138-3) shall not impede the freedom of newspapers (including similar communications; the same shall apply hereinafter) or magazines to publish reports and commentaries concerning elections. However, they shall not abuse their freedom of expression by publishing false information or distorting facts, thereby undermining the fairness of elections.“ See also The Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association, ”Unified Opinion of the Editorial Committee of The Japan Newspaper Publishers & Editors Association on Article 148 of the Public Offices Election Act (Summary),” 1966. https://www.pressnet.or.jp/statement/report/661208_99.html
10
See Brittany Kaiser, “The Accusation: The Massive Scandal That Rocked Facebook,” translated by Shigeru Somedani et al., HarperCollins Japan.[original title; Targeted]
11
The usage rate of LINE among government agencies and other organizations is 78%, and among local governments it is 64%. “Guidelines for the Use of LINE Services Based on a Survey of LINE Usage in Government Agencies and Local Public Organizations” Cabinet Office, etc. https://www.cyber.go.jp/pdf/policy/general/guideline_gaiyo210430.pdf
12
For data on private sector personnel accepted by the central government as of October 2025, by ministry, see the following. Cabinet Secretariat “Status of Accepting Personnel from the Private Sector into the Government” https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/jinjikyoku/pdf/ukeire_r070331.pdf
13
Below are examples of censorship and other issues related to the recent genocide in Gaza. “(Letter to Google Management) Stop Censorship and Discrimination Against Muslims, Arabs, and Palestinians” https://jca.apc.org/2024/05/google%E7%B5%8C%E5%96%B6%E9%99%A3% E5%AE%9B%E6%9B%B8%E7%B0%A1%E3%83%A0%E3%82%B9%E3%83%AA%E3%83%A0% E3%80%81%E3%82%A2%E3%83%A9%E3%83%96%E4%BA%BA%E3%80%81%E3%83%91%E3%83%AC%E3%82%B9%E3%83%81%E3%83%8A/
“(leavex.eu) An Open Letter Calling on All European Politicians and Leaders to Abandon X/Twitter” https://www.alt-movements.org/no_more_capitalism/hankanshi-info/knowledge-base/leavex-eu_open-letter-to-all-european-politicians-and-leaders_jp/ “(dropsitenews) Leaked data reveals large-scale Israeli campaign to remove pro-Palestinian posts on Facebook and Instagram” https://www.alt-movements.org/no_more_capitalism/hankanshi-info/knowledge-base/dropsitenews_leaked-data-israeli-censorship-meta_jp/