日本時間で本日未明の、米軍によるスーダンとアフガニスタン爆撃は、動機として
はいつもの、国内でピンチに立った（「不適切な関係」で）大統領の海外での軍事行
動による人気回復（照れ隠し）ということですが、今後深刻な問題（特に日本に）を
呼びそうです。
　ここでは国防総省のニュースブリーフィング（長いので記者との質疑は途中略、し
かしこのやり取りには重要な情報があるので必要な方は
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/をチェックしください））を転載しておきます。
このニュースは当然米国を始めとする世界のメディアが報道しているわけですが、い
つも軍事問題ではWebページにきちんとニュースを整理して置いてくれるFASの
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/strike_back.htm
が便利でしょう。

　日本から見て第一の問題は、今回の爆撃がどのような方法で行われたか公表されて
ないことです。ある報道はトマホークミサイル数百基が使用された。しかしスーダン
での目撃者は航空機による爆撃だと言っています。アフガンでは爆撃するのにどうし
てもイランかパキスタン上空を飛ばなければならないので、こちらではトマホークの
みを使ったのでしょう。いずれにしてもヨコスカに本拠を置く第７艦隊の仕事です（
第７艦隊の担当は喜望峰まで）。

　国防長官がこう言っているように、
        Those who attack our people will find no safe place, no refuge from
the long arm of justice.
「テロにはテロで」ということですが、その形態はヤクザの抗争よりもたちが悪くな
って、国際法を無意味にするものです。日本政府がこの蛮行にきちんと抗議できるの
か。ポイントには以下のようなことがあります。

（１）今回の爆撃に加わった第７艦隊の艦船にはヨコスカを母港とするものがあるの
でないか。
（２）もしそうなら、日本政府はイギリス政府と違って事前に相談されていなかった
とのことだが、これは事前協議制度に反するものである。
（３）このようなテロの応酬では、多くの在日米軍基地を抱える（第７艦隊の本拠地
）日本にも、今後報復テロの可能性が高くなるが、日本政府はその点をどのように認
識しているか。
（４）このような事態も、いわゆる「周辺事態」として日本は協力する必要があるの
か。
（５）このような「国家テロ」に抗議しないとしたら、「周辺事態」での日米「協力
」は日本自身が「テロ国家」になることを意味している。
（６）アメリカは今回の攻撃に続く爆撃を示唆しているが、日本政府はこれをやめさ
せるよう説得するのか。第７艦隊の基地使用を認め続けるのか。
（７）アメリカは、日本政府に爆撃の対象が「真犯人」であるという証拠を示したか。
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
= N  E  W  S      B  R  I  E  F  I  N  G
=
= OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
= (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
= WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
====================================================

DoD News Briefing
Thursday, August 20, 1998 - 2:30 p.m. (EDT)
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
(Also participating in this briefing is General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff)
        Secretary Cohen:  Good afternoon.
        As you've already heard from President Clinton, we have today
conducted military strikes at several facilities that have supported
international terrorist groups.  The United States and the rest of the
community of civilized nations have made it clear time and time again that
the violence and the bloodshed and the murderous acts of international
terrorists will not be tolerated.
        Today's military strikes against those terrorist camps and
facilities are a part of a continuing effort to defend U.S. citizens and
interests abroad against the very real threat posed by international
terrorists.
        In the wake of the tragic and treacherous attacks on our embassies
in East Africa and in light of the continuing patterns of specific threats
against U.S. citizens and facilities, we've taken these actions to reduce
the ability of these terrorist organizations to train and equip their
misguided followers or to acquire weapons of mass destruction for their use
in campaigns of terror.
        We recognize that these strikes will not eliminate the problem, but
our message is clear.  There will be no sanctuary for terrorists and no
limit to our resolve to defend American citizens and our interests, our
ideals of democracy and law against these cowardly attacks.
        Those who attack our people will find no safe place, no refuge from
the long arm of justice.
        General Shelton is going to provide you with as much operational
detail as we can on the facilities that have been struck, but I need to
forewarn you -- there will not be much operational detail provided.  We are
engaged in a difficult confrontation with the forces of international
terrorism, the unique nature of the terrorist threat, the lack of regard
for international law, the willingness to specifically target innocent
civilians, transnational operations which defy traditional means of
influence.  All of these factors and more have forced us to adopt some very
different approaches to the problem, and therefore we do not intend to
provide, at least for now, the specific numbers or units of U.S. military
forces that have been involved, nor will we discuss the specific weapons
and tactics employed in these strikes.
        With that, General Shelton will give you some details about the
facilities that we targeted and why they were chosen.
        Q:      Excuse me, Mr. Secretary.  Can you just briefly tell us at
least whether these were airstrikes or...
        Secretary Cohen:  General Shelton is going to give you a brief
summation of what targets were attacked.
        General Shelton:  Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
        Good afternoon.  First, let me underscore what Secretary Cohen has
said.  This is not simply a response to some specific act, but a concerted
effort to defend U.S. citizens and our interests around the globe against a
very real and a very deadly terrorist threat.
        As many of you are aware, our intelligence community has provided
us with convincing information based on a variety of intelligence sources
that Usama Bin Ladin's network of terrorists was involved in the planning,
the financing, and the execution of the attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania.  Attacks that killed over 300 people including 12 Americans,
and wounded thousands more.
        This is by no means the first time the Usama Bin Ladin network has
been connected to terrorist attacks.  Bin Ladin himself has admitted to
attempting to kill American servicemen on their way to and serving in our
humanitarian mission to Somalia in 1992.  His supporters and followers have
tried to assassinate the President of Egypt and even the Pope.
        And as recently as three months ago, Bin Ladin himself repeated his
fatwa against Americans in order to attack Americans and our allies
throughout the world and to make no distinction between military and
civilians, including women and children.
        The facilities we struck today in Afghanistan and Sudan are
important parts of the Bin Ladin network of terrorist groups.  At 1:30 p.m.
(EDT) simultaneous military strikes were carried out against known
terrorist training facilities in remote regions of Afghanistan and an
industrial facility in Khartoum, Sudan.  The targets selected and the
timing of the strikes, 7:30 p.m. in Sudan and 10:00 p.m. in Afghanistan,
were part of our overall effort to minimize collateral damage at the sites.
        Now if I can direct your attention to these photo boards.  The
three facilities in Afghanistan we struck are the Zhawar Kili Al-Badr base
camp, training camp, and support complex.
        A number of terrorist groups are associated with these facilities
including Bin Ladin's al Kadar, the armed Islamic Group, and the Egyptian
Islamic Jihad.  These bases provide refuge for terrorists, house the
infrastructure for their funding international travel, and are used to
train terrorists in the tactics and weapons of international terrorism.
        The base camp is the main headquarters facility for the complex and
it includes storage, housing, training and administration facilities for
the complex.  It is also the key command and control node.
        The support camp is the primary logistics area for the complex and
includes storage for a large amount of weapons and ammunition.
        The four primary training camps, one of which is shown here, are
used for training terrorist tactics, indoctrination, weapons, and the use
of improvised explosive devices.  Within the camp are numerous structures
-- tent stands, obstacle courses, firing ranges, and burned areas for
explosive testing and training.
        The blowup of the west camp is indicative of the camp
characteristics in general and includes evidence of continuing expansion of
the facilities.
        We have also had convincing information that for some time the Bin
Ladin network has been actively seeking to acquire weapons of mass
destruction including chemical weapons for use against U.S. citizens and
our interests around the world.
        This next photo is for the Shifa chemical complex in northeast
Khartoum, Sudan.  The intelligence community is confident that this
facility is involved in the production of chemical weapons agents including
precursor chemicals for deadly V series of nerve agents like, for example, VX.
        We also know that Bin Ladin has extensive ties to the Sudanese
government which controls this chemical facility.
        Before taking your questions, let me emphasize that although we are
confident that Usama Bin Ladin's network was involved in the criminal
attack on embassies and the murder of more than 300 innocent victims, the
actions we have taken today should not be viewed simply as retaliation for
those attacks.  Rather, as the President and as Secretary Cohen have said,
this has been an exercise of self defense against an imminent and
continuing terrorist threat.
        There can be no safe haven for terrorists.  The international
community must not tolerate such acts nor accept those nations who would
aid or harbor terrorists.  We owe it to our citizens and to the citizens of
all law abiding nations to do all that we can to prevent terrorist actions
and to bring those responsible for spreading hate and death to justice.
        With that, Secretary Cohen and I will take your questions.
        Q:      Mr. Secretary, can you tell us, does this just involve U.S.
strikes, missile strikes, or were troops actually put on the ground, albeit
temporarily...
        Secretary Cohen:  For the time being we are not going to discuss
this in view of the fact that there may be other operations that might be
required.  We do not want to place any of our forces in any kind of
jeopardy or compromise their position.  So for the time being we are going
to simply indicate that strikes were carried out, and we will at a later
time discuss that.
        Q:      Were these brief strikes?  Are they still going on or have
the strikes ended?
        Secretary Cohen:  The strikes should have ended.
Q:      What are the whereabouts of Usama Bin Ladin right now?  Do you
believe that you killed him in these strikes?
        Secretary Cohen:  I have no idea where he is at this time.  We
designed this operation to attack his infrastructure, and that's precisely
what we have done.
        Q:      Do you know whether he was in any of these facilities when
the strikes occurred?
        Secretary Cohen:  We do not know.
        Q:      What were some of the...
        Secretary Cohen:  That was not our design.  Our design was to take
down this structure which is responsible for training hundreds if not
thousands of terrorists.
        Q:      What were some of the barometers of success here on the
plant and also on the camps?  Total the structure, part?  Can you give us a
sense?
        Secretary Cohen:  Our plan was to attack these sites with
sufficient power to certainly disrupt them and, hopefully, destroy them.
Some of these are solid structures, others are less so.  But we believe
given the targeting that was done, with the capability that was unleashed,
it would cause sufficient damage to disrupt them for some time.
        Q:      Were there any U.S. casualties in these raids?
        Secretary Cohen:  Not to our knowledge, no.
        Q:      Have you had any BDA yet?
        Secretary Cohen:  It's too early to make that assessment just yet.
        Q:      Can you also clarify, was there one training camp?  I
believe you said there were four...
        General Shelton:  There are a total of four training camps.  All
four were hit.  We only addressed one of those today.
        Q:      Is it correct that seven sites in Afghanistan essentially
were...
        General Shelton:  That make up the one complex, yes.
        Q:      Seven sites in Afghanistan?
        General Shelton:  That make up the one complex.
        Q:      Could you tell us where this is in Afghanistan generally?
        General Shelton:  It's basically about 94 miles south of Kabul.
Proximity to the Afghan border...  A few kilometers to the Pakistani border.
        Q:      Did Pakistan provide permission for overflight or did they
participate in any way?
        Secretary Cohen:  We're not going to discuss any operational
details of this.
        Q:      Did any other country take part in these raids?
        Secretary Cohen:  No, this was simply the United States.
        Q:      In Khartoum, is that a residential area that that's near?
What sort of area is that?
        General Shelton:  In Khartoum, the target was located in an
industrial complex area.  There are surrounding facilities.  We did
everything we possibly could to minimize the collateral damage associated
with that, but it is in an industrial area so we would anticipate very
minimum numbers of collateral damage.
（以下略）
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−

/////////////////////////
　　　　　　青木雅彦
　　　　  Masahiko Aoki
      btree@osk.3web.ne.jp
////////////////////////
 

3月、4月、5月、6月、7月、8月、9月、10月、11月、12月

---