山谷労働者福祉会館のなすびです。
昨年12月に二度目の墜落事故を起こしたV22オスプレイについて、事故調査委員会
による調査が進められてきました。そしてその結果が公式に報告される前に、調査委
員会のメンバー数名がV22オスプレイの構造的欠陥をメディアに公表しました。
事故調査委員会に参加しているパイロットによれば、オスプレイは水圧系統とソフ
トウェアがそもそも欠陥を抱えており、そのことを海兵隊上層部も知りながら、国防
省からの予算獲得のためにそれを隠していたとのことです。
本来、公式な報告が公表される前のこのような告発は異例なのですが、公式報告に
この構造的欠陥が記述されない（あるいは矮小化される）ことを危惧した数名の委員
（委員会は12人）が匿名でインタビューに答え、これらのことが明らかになりました
。
既にオスプレイの事故により、23人の海兵隊員が死亡しています。民間人はもちろ
んのこと、兵隊の命など駒としか思わない米軍を典型的に表した問題です。もっとも
、予算云々よりも、劣化ウラン弾の件を見れば分かるように、たとえ自国兵士に犠牲
者が出ても軍事的にトータルに効率が良ければ、彼らは平気で使うでしょう。
連中はこんなものを沖縄に配備しようとしていたんです。
（以下、4/5のワシントン・ポストから転載）
-----------------------------------------------------------
Pilots Criticize Osprey's Testing Flaw Was Known, But Wasn't
Fixed
By Mary Pat Flaherty and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, April 5, 2001; Page A01
JACKSONVILLE, N.C. -- The crash of a V-22 Osprey aircraft that killed
four
Marines here in December was caused by a design flaw that had been
known for
months but went largely uncorrected, according to pilots who participated
in
an official investigation of the accident.
The pilots, all current or former officers in the Marines'
first Osprey
squadron, said the design flaw in the aircraft's hydraulic system was
compounded by a software glitch that could have been detected by more
rigorous testing. But they said they believe both problems slipped
by
because the Marine Corps wanted to win Pentagon funding for full production
of the plane.
That approval, they said, would have freed up money to
go back to the
drawing board and re-engineer the hydraulics and software. The production
decision was postponed after two Osprey crashes last year killed 23
Marines,
raising questions about the safety of the aircraft.
The Marine Corps' report on the second crash is expected
to be made
public as soon as today. It is unusual for participants in a military
"mishap board" to discuss their views, especially before the release
of a
crash report. But several of the board's 12 members agreed to be interviewed
on condition of anonymity. They said they were ready to speak out because
they increasingly distrust the Corps' leadership and worry that some
of
their conclusions might be omitted or minimized in the public report.
"People who have been heroes all my life are no longer
my heroes," one
board member said, conveying his dismay in the generals overseeing
development of the Osprey, a novel aircraft that takes off like a helicopter
and then tilts its rotors forward to fly like a conventional airplane.
While "the Marine Corps has never let me down" in more
than 15 years of
service, another pilot added, "this is the first time I've seen the
Marine
Corps lose control."
After the December crash, the Corps grounded its initial
fleet of eight
remaining Ospreys and the secretary of defense appointed an independent
panel to review the program.
The release of the accident report comes just as the review
panel, headed
by retired Marine Gen. John R. Dailey, is preparing its findings and
recommendations, which could decide the fate of the Osprey. The Marine
Corps
has made the development of the V-22 a top priority and proposes to
buy 360
of the planes in a $40 billion plan to replace its aging, Vietnam-era
helicopters.
Within weeks of the Dec. 11 crash, Marine investigators
suspected that it
was caused by a hydraulics failure combined with a software glitch.
But
pilots on the mishap board say they believe senior Marine officials
--
including at least a handful of generals who oversee Marine aviation
-- knew
about the hydraulics problem long before the crash and postponed addressing
it. They said they are certain that paperwork about the design flaw
was sent
up the chain of command but they don't know how high it went.
A Marine spokesman, Maj. Patrick Gibbons, said the Corps
would not
comment on the pilots' allegations while the accident report was pending.
"If there are concerns on the part of our Marines, we want to deal
with
those, and we're confident that the investigation has addressed all
the
relevant issues," he said.
Gibbons added that any mistrust among squadron members
"is a subjective
thing."
"Assuring them and ourselves that we have thoroughly reviewed
the Osprey
program is the very reason we got the Defense Department's inspector
general
involved and the independent review panel," the spokesman said.
Two of the pilots said the software glitch should have
been caught in
engineering reviews while the Osprey was being tested, before it left
the
experimental stage. In the December crash, they said, the software
should
have triggered a backup hydraulic system after a primary system began
to
leak. Instead, the software worsened the situation each time the pilot
hit a
reset button.
Hydraulics can be likened to the muscles of an aircraft,
and flight
control software to the brains. Hydraulics power the tilt of the engines
and
the pitch of the propellers, while the software helps the pilot control
the
aircraft. Both are vital to keep the aircraft flying.
The two pilots said their report raises broader questions
about how such
a serious software glitch got into an aircraft that was in regular
use. They
said their draft of the report recommended that the Pentagon and the
Osprey's manufacturers "address the process failure . . . that allowed
that
to make it through."
The hydraulics problems are even more troubling, the pilots
said. Of six
who were interviewed, all but one said the aircraft requires some
fundamental re-engineering, particularly in the areas called nacelles
that
house the tilt-rotor engines and are tightly packed with hydraulic,
fuel and
electrical lines. The sixth dissented, saying he thought the plane
merely
needed "seasoning," which he argued is usual for a new aircraft.
The Osprey has hydraulic lines made of titanium that operate
at a steady
5,000 pounds of pressure per square inch (psi), compared with 2,000
to 3,000
psi in many aircraft, a design that cuts the Osprey's weight and gives
it a
longer range. The titanium lines, however, have proven susceptible
to
abrasions and nicks, particularly in the tightly confined nacelle,
where
lines have been found to wear thin from rubbing, exposure to sand and
jostling as the heavy engines shift from helicopter to airplane mode.
In the past, some Marine officials have acknowledged cutting
corners in
the development of the Osprey. In an interview hours before the December
crash, Lt. Gen. Fred McCorkle, the head of Marine aviation, said, "When
we
built that airplane, we built it on the cheap . . . we cut every ounce
of
fat that we could cut."
Using inexpensive parts, such as plastic fasteners, "hurt
the
maintainability and reliability of the early airplanes," McCorkle said.
But,
he added, "on the next lot, all that . . . has been fixed."
The pilots and other Marine officers said the Osprey's
problems were
well-known to top officials long before the December crash, because
complaints about them were filed with the manufacturers. In addition,
they
said, the problems were studied in the testing process from November
1999
through July 2000, and some led to formal "hazardous incident" reports.
Technicians "talked about that problem of abraded hydraulic
lines and
leaking lines a lot. It's been a known problem," said Philip E. Coyle,
who
retired this year as the Pentagon's chief weapons tester. Coyle oversaw
the
nine-month testing of the Osprey under conditions meant to resemble
real
operations.
During the test period, hydraulic failures were the most
common
mechanical problem, including 39 instances in which the failure posed
"potential safety implications," Coyle told the Dailey panel reviewing
the
Osprey program.
Indeed, at about the time of the December crash, Osprey
mechanics were
directed to wrap Teflon tape around the hydraulic lines, pilots said.
A
Marine spokesman confirmed that account.
"There were known hydraulic problems, and titanium is,
surprisingly, very
brittle," said one member of the mishap board. "We recognized that
there are
fundamental problems with the hydraulics in the nacelle."
Another Osprey pilot said he believes that the aircraft's
manufacturers
-- Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing Co. -- knew about the problems
from
complaints filed to them and from internal military reports that were
shared
with them. "With as many [maintenance deficiency] reports as we put
in on
this, Bell and Boeing have to know the hydraulics need to be re-engineered,"
he said.
Both companies declined this week to answer questions
submitted in
writing. "Since most of these questions deal with the accident
investigation, it would be inappropriate to comment, since the findings
of
the investigating bodies have not been released," Boeing spokeswoman
Madelyn
Bush wrote in response.
"Just ditto what Madelyn told you," said Bell spokesman
Bob Leder,
adding: "We believe there are some erroneous assumptions in the questions
you asked us." He said he could not be more specific because the assumptions
were "embedded in questions about the accident investigation, and we
feel it
would be inappropriate for us to comment before the release of the
mishap
report."
The Marine investigation of an earlier Osprey crash, in
which 19 Marines
died in Arizona in April 2000, blamed pilot error. The report also
noted
that "the frequency of servicing/maintenance requirements for aircraft
hydraulic systems, though not causal in this mishap, is concerning."
But
that opinion was omitted from the initial public version of the report.
It
was made public only after it was quoted in a presentation to the Dailey
panel and after media outlets pushed for access to the full report.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A39416-2001Apr4.html
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